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This thesis considers the impact of return on investment,
progress payments, and cash flow in the shipbuilding industry,
It evolved from the L970 DOD Industry Advisory Council (LAC)
Subcommittee Report. Analysis is devoted to the progress
payment method recommended by the Navy Task Group to Study
Shipbuilding Progress Payments. An examination is made of
both Government profit policy and contract financing as they
relate to the shipbuilding industry.
A computer model was developed which makes explicit the
discounted cash flow in a given contract and displays all
government payments to the contractor as well as the con-
tractor's share of contract financings The time-adjusted
rate of return which is implied by the terms and conditions
of the contract is computed by the model. A decision process
for computing a profit negotiation position is developed
which integrates (1) the lAC profit computation system, (2)
the proposed shipbuilding progress payment method, and (3)
the prevailing market conditions.
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In developing the background for this thesis it is
appropriate to first discuss the basis for its development.
The most recent impetus on return on capital investment
and payments on progress for the defense shipbuilding
industry came from the Report of the Industry Advisory
Council (lAC) Subcommittee to Consider Defense Industry
Contract Financing, published 11 June 1971 by the Department
of Defense, This report, although not the first in the
area, was used as the starting point for this thesis. The
lAC report is based upon data of the arospace industry, and
its recommendations were directed at contracting relationships
and procedures used within that industry. The Subcommittee
recommended further study on contracts involving payments
on physical progress, a procedure used primarily within the
defense construction and shipbuilding industries. In response,
the Navy formed a task group to study progress payments
within the shipbuilding industry^ The report of that task
(2)group has been used for the development of this thesis.
As stated in the lAC report, progress payments and cost
reimbursements are an important source of contractor
financing o The long lead times for procurement of materials
and subsystems and the heavy investment in engineering and

production prior to the delivery of the first contract end
item makes these payments a necessary part of contracting.
The premise is also stated that the use by the contractor
of this one form of financing would save the government
money, since financing the contract entirely by private
sources would greatly increase the system costs. There is
also a question as to whether or not the required amount of
(3)
commercial credit would be available.
1 1
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Figure 1.
As can be seen in Figure 1, over the past several years
there has been a continuing increase in the inventory levels
that are maintained by defense contractors to meet their
business committments. This has caused in turn a sharp
increase in short term funds requirements that have been
met by increased levels of government financing, bank loans,
and prime contractor's accounts payable. In addition to the

increasing inventory levels, there has been a sharp increase
in the dollar amount of progress payments outstanding.
Figure 2 displays this increase. The lAC Subcommittee
states that this increase is directly related to the growth
in demand for pre-delivery financing of defense work.
-L
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I ! M M 1 I M I I I I I I I I I I '




M 1 , I I ! i I M I I I I I I I I I M ! ' ! I
m
J_L
1953 1954 1955 •1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Figure 2
.
Coupled with the progress payment problems is the profit
policy which the government used. The two are interrelated
in the following discussion.
(1) If progress payments decrease, interest* from
private source financing increases and contractors' realized
profits will decreasco
Profit policy affects the ability of contractors
to increase their equity capital and, consequently, their









Under the present ASPR Regulations interest is not an
allowable expense. The problem of whether or not interest
charges should be allowable is not considered in this thesis.
The matter is discussed at great length in the lAC Subcommittee
Report Appendix H and J. g

Regarding profit policy, the Department of Defense
has long been interested in the employment of the contractor's
return on invested capital in the establishment of profit
negotiation objectives in non-competitive procurements
«
However, as of this date, a workable policy has not been
promulgated. An attempt was made in the early 1960 's during
the development of the Weighted Guidelines Method but was
abandoned because of the difficulty in apportioning a
contractor's total investment in facilities and operating
capital to specific contracts. The need to revise the
profit policy has become increasingly more apparent as
money has grown tighter. Contractors are becoming more
aware of how their available dollars are invested and where
they are earning their highest return for the investment
of those dollars. In most cases, the return in the commer-
cial sector is superior to that earned in the defense
sector.
(2) The other side of the profit policy picture is the
desire of DOD for contractors to invest in their own
facilities and not require use of Government facilities to
perform a contract. Theoretically, one of the policy
objectives of the Weighted Guidelines is to "discourage
(5)
contractors from relying on Government resources." The
Armed Services Procurement Regulation "Manual for Contract
Pricing, under Weighted Guidelines,. Selected Factor-Source
of Resources" states "The idea behind this factor is to

encourage the contractor to acquire and use his own plant
and equipment, and to locate and use his own financial
sources o The contractor's dependence on financial assistance
(6)
in the form of facilities must be considered »" As
explained in the "Manual for Contract Pricing," "if the
contractor fulfills our objectives and uses his own resources
in the performance of a contract, the assigned weight for
this factor is 0." Therefore, how could there by any
incentive for the contractor to provide facilities in the
performance of a contract? Of course, the problem is more
complex, but the point is that no positive incentive exists
for contractors' investments.
Various schemes have been attempted or studied prior
to the lAC method which is discussed later in this thesis.
The underlying idea most of the procedures use is to
weight the impact from both the normal weighted guidelines
method and the return on investment approach. Over the
years, the various weights have ranged from seventy percent
on weighted guidelines and thirty percent on investment,
to the lAC Subcommittee recommendation of fifty percent
for both. Within the investment portion, the weights have
varied from a ratio of two to one for facilities against
operating capital and equipment, to two to one for operating
capital and equipment against facilities. (There are
currently under consideration two proposed changes to the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations , both incorporating
10

changes to the profit determination procedures » These are
discussed in Chapter IIIo)
B. DEFINITIONS
Before proceeding further, it is important that the
basic premises and terms used in this thesis be defined.
1, Time Adjusted Return on Investment : the maximum
rate of interest that could be paid for the capital employed
(7)
over the life of an investment without loss on the project.
In terms of the model described in Chapter V , Rate of
Return is defined as the discount rate that makes the present
(8)
value of a project equal to the cost of the probject.
2
,
Capital Invested as a Basis for Return on Investment :
the book value of the total capital employed in fulfilling
a contract, weighted for risk and motivation. There are
other definitions which are certainly pertinent and are
described here for future reference information., The
Logistics Management Institute defines capital invested as
equity capital plus long-term debt. The Government Accounting
Office expresses it as "capital in all investments whether
financed by current liabilites , long-term debt, equity
capital, or other items on the liability and capital side
of the balance sheet." The Air Force Finance Contracting
Model (discussed later) uses investment as the work in
process of a contractor on a specific contract.
3, Profit on Capital : the term used to express the




in a defense contract. A fifty percent weight is assigned
to the profit on cost and a fifty percent weight on the
capital invested (see preceding definition),
C. THE 1970 INDUSTRY ADVISORY COUNCIL SUBCOMMITTEE
The Industry Advisory Council Subcommittee was chartered
on 3 Noveruber 1970 to consider Defense Industry Contract
Financing with J. Ronald Fox, ASA(I&L) as chairman, to
study and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
on the following topics
:
(1) The determination of a fair and equitable relation-
ship between the Department and contractor concerning the
division of financing responsibility.
(2) Current defense contract financing procedures as
they relate to rates of progress payments, frequency of
payment and standards of eligibility,
(3) Current procedures whereby reimbursement under
cost type contracts includes incurred but unpaid costs
„
(4) An assessment of the merits of using cash disburse-
ments rather than accrued liabilities as the basis of
Government financing on the supplier/subcontract portions
of defense contracts.
(5) A review of related Defense policies such as profit
policy, allowability of interest costs, and others, which
might require change to better accommodate a change in
financing policy, including an assessment of the estimated




(6) An assessment of the availability of private
(10)
financing for defense contractors.
1. The Air Force Contract Financing Model
Among the tools used by the lAC Subcommittee in
developing their findings , was a contract financing model
of the Air Force called FINMOD, This is a computer model
which attempts to quantify the contributions of each source
of contract financing under various financing arrangements.
It is capable of giving a comprehensive cash flow analysis
based on inputs identical to the parameters of cash
transactions which take place in actual contracts. The
Air Force Contract Financing Model (FINMOD)* simulates
daily sources and applications of funds during the entire
life cycle of a contracts The model has been designed to
accept as inputs all of the known constraints and variables
which influence contractor cash flows. It is important
to note that the Air Force model does not measure the total
investment of a contractor but only the amount of the
investment in work-in-process.
The work-in-process of a prime contractor is
financed by the following sources as assumed by the model:
(a) Prime contractor's cash investment
(b) Government progress payments or cost reimburse-
ments
(c) Accrued wages and salaries
See Appendix C, Figure 19.
13

(d) Accounts payable to vendors and subcontractors
(e) Bank float on checks written but not yet charged
against the contractor
In all, the lAC Subcommittee collected data on 166
contracts and analyzed the 95 fixed price contracts that
were included. The most significant observations were these:
(a) Substantial inequities existed in the level of
financing provided by prime contractors compared to sub-
contractors.
(b) No standard exists for the uniform treatment
of payment frequency and payment delay.
(c) Substantial inequities exist in the level of
government financing provided to large versus small contrac-
tors, and the frequency of progress payments varies directly
with contract size.
2 . Level of Gash Investment
In terms of the different cash investment levels
of the contractors, the lAC Subcommittee stated that one
approach to eliminating these differences would be to
standardize all financing variables and adjust the rate of
payment to achieve a desired level of government investment.
The basic guidance for this is stated below as it comes
from the LAC Report:
"Before considering what progress payment
rate should be established, it may be useful
to recall three reasons why the Department ot
Defense provides assistance in the form of pro-
gress payments: (1) Without progress payments,
the contractor's required investment in working
capital would become excessive for large defense
contracts with a long preproduction period:

(2) without progress payment financing,
substantial fluctuations in the volume of
defense sales of any given contractor
would make it difficult and costly for him
continually to adjust his capital structure
or borrowing to cover peak financing re-
quirements; and (3) the government is able
to borrow capital at a lower cost than pri-
vate industry. The lower cost of government
borrowing has been advanced in support of
arguments that the government's investment
in any defense contract should be as large
as possible."*
Since this study has been completed, a method has been
proposed in the two studies on profit policy that consider
both investment and risk. Both proposals recommend a
procedure that adjusts the profit for Contract Capital
associated with the contract type and risk. This is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter IIIo
3 . lAC Recommendations and Implementations
The final report to the Secretary of Defense was
completed 11 June 1971 » Among the recommendations were the
following:
(a) Usual progress payments and cost reimbursements
for all contractors, except small businesses, will be made
bi-weekly at a rate of eighty percent for progress payments,
100 percent for cost reimbursements on the actual disburse-
ments made during the contract. Cost reimbursements and
progress payments for in-house costs will be paid on the
basis of costs incurred during the contract.
* DOD Report of the Industry Advisory Council Subcommittee




(b) Profit should be determined with a fifty percent
weight on the weighted guidelines based on cost and fifty
percent on the capital employed. The standard return on
capital is defined as a four year average of the profits
before interest and taxes on the total equity and debt of
the FTC-SEC commercial sample. A detailed discussion re-
garding the lAC Subcommittee's recommendations for Profit
on Capital is contained in Chapter III.
The Subcommittee also recommended that further study
be conducted for progress payments, based on a percentage
or stage-of -completion , in particular to contracts for
shipbuilding or ship conversion, alteration, or repair
inasmuch as these are the only types of contracts on which
pre-delivery payments are based on a percentage of completion,
The recommendations of the lAC Report were endorsed,
and accordingly, DPC 9^ and 96 were promulgated. These made
interim changes to the ASPR sections regarding progress
payments and cost reimbursement. In effect ASPR now states
that progress payments will be made no more frequently than
bi-weekly and will only be made on eighty percent of the
actual disbursements of the contractor. Shipbuilding,
repair, and alteration to ships were, however, excluded from
this revised clause.
The Profit on Capital approach is still under study,
and although two different methods have been developed, a
standardized procedure has not yet been promulgated.
16

Do THE NAVY TASK GROUP
Following the Subcommittee's recommendations for an
in-depth study on progress payments based on a percentage
of completion, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (FM)
and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (I&L) established the
Task Group to Study Shipbuilding Progress Payments on
August 3, 1971,
As defined, the Task Group's study entailed the following
(1) Collection of statistical data
(2) Collection of cost data
(3) Documentation of procedures and practices
(4) Analysis and evaluation of data
(5) Preparation of a written report, including impact
of any recommended changes .-
Using the progress payment philosophy and guidelines
of the lAC Subcommittee as stated above, the Task Group
to Study Shipbuilding Progress Payments, with the assistance
of FINMOD, has developed a procedure for payment based on
progress in the Defense Shipbuilding Industry.
The Task Group investigation revealed that the present
method of determining physical progress as the guide for
progress payments is inadequate and has recommended that
an alternative be used.. To summarize, the Task Group
recommended that progress payments be paid as prescribed
in ASPR (modified by DPC 9k and 96) „ In addition, the Task
Group recommended that interim payments be made as a means
17

of Liquidating the progress payments. To incorporate these
into the progress payment scheme, the interim payments
should be made when progress payments are equal to a pre-
determined percentage of contract price. The exact amount
of the interim payment is a function of the length of the
contract in years and the total payments to date. In
contracts that provide for the delivery of more than one
vessel or component that is individually priced, such as
software, an additional interim payment will be made upon
the preliminary acceptance of each vessel or component.
This payment is a fixed percentage of contract price and
directly related to overall interim payments discussed above.
The interim payments will not be made unless the
demonstrated performance on the physical progress of the
contract at the time of eligibility is at a predescribed
percentage of the contract completion. This is the link
between the contract cost and physical progress. If the
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair determines
that the physical completion is not at the predescribed
level, the interim payment will not be made until that level
is reached. There is also a reserve for performance for
the purpose of meeting the cost of finishing unfinished work
or correcting defects which is the percentage difference
between the indicated percentage of completion of the contract
price and the payments that are made, A detailed discussion,




II o SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY PROFIT AND INVESTMENT
A„ INVESTMENT AND COST POST WORLD WAR II
lo Worldwide Shipbuilding
The World War II industrial mobilization had a major
impact on the United States shipbuilding industry. To
provide the great number of ships that were required to
move troops and supplies and fight the war, substantial
investments were made to modernize facilities, and new
techniques were adapted that produced ships in an assembly
line or series basis. To permit standardization and
efficiency, different shipyards specialized in a particular
type ship which, when coupled with the series operation,
provided the required ships at a relatively low cost. So
successful was the effort, that President Truman declared
at the close of the War, "the shipbuilding accomplishments
of the United States not only astonished the world but more
important than that, defeated the enemy." The end of the
war, however, brought about a shift in emphasis within the
country, and the importance of shipbuilding became obscured
by other events » Nevertheless, the importance of efficient
and competent shipbuilding and ship repair capability to
seapower's role in the national defense has not diminished.
Modern Naval vessels are still required from a military
standpoint and merchant shipping remains an important part
of the national economy.
19

In the shipbuilding industry there are two terms, capacity
and capability, which because of their distinct differences,
require definition. Capacity is identified with and measured
by the physical assets of a company, such as shipyards,
equipment or machinery. Capability on the other hand, is
comprised of human and economic factors that determine the
potential of these physical assets. "Among the determinates
of a nation's shipbuilding capability are its national
objectives and policies, its economic and labor conditions,
its state of scientific and technological development, and
its shipbuilding experience. While capacity and capability
are interdependent in the shipbuilding industry, they are
^ ., ^. ^ ,,(11)not identical."
The dominant warship building nations in the modern
world are the United States and the Soviet Union. Each
produces more than twice the output of all the rest of the
(12)
worldo At the same time, these two countries are minor
producers in merchant shipbuilding, where Japan dominates
the world market in both number of ships and in total tonnage.
Figure 3 clearly shows Japan's superiority „ A world ship-
building survey of merchant vessels 1000 tons or over,
conducted in July 1971, showed that the United States had
sixty vessels of 1,484,600 gross tons either under construction
or on order as compared to Japan who had 866 vessels of
(13)
39,528,000 gross tons. Approximately sixty-six percent
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*House Armed Services Committee Report Number 91-71, p. 9989.
In terms of capacity, as defined earlier, Japan
has the physical assets necessary to build a large number
of ships and very large ships, but since they have not
built complex ships such as aircraft carriers for many years,
they presently do not have the capability.
2 . Nature of the Industry
Shipbuilding is an assembly type industry similar
in many ways to the automobile industry. But, just as there
are similarities in the procedures, there are differences
created by the complexities of shipbuilding that set it
apart from other assembly industries » Most assembly
industries produce a large number of relatively low cost
units. Shipbuilding produces a small number of high cost
units. The industry is very labor intensive with forty to
fifty percent of the total shipyard cost in labor and
21

and overhead o For example, the cost breakdown of a
$12,000,000 cargo ship built in the United States in 1966
p n (15)was as follows
:










Of the other material item, $2,560,000 or about 24
percent was externally manufactured and not produced
in the prime shipyard.
Even in the highly automated Japanese shipyards
labor plays a major role in shipbuilding. As stated by an
officer of one of Japan's largest shipbuilding companies,
"The shipbuilding industry involves a great deal of manual
labor. It is a hard -work industry and there is a trend on
the part of young people to dislike manual labor." This
general reluctance of Japanese workers to get involved in
the labor of shipbuilding, combined with technical problems
that make it difficult to achieve complete automation, has
(16)
caused labor costs to continually rise.
Total employment in the United States' private
shipyards has remained fairly constant over the past few
years (although there have been large fluctuations in
various regions of the country) » Employment in Naval
shipyards has varied more than in the private shipyards,
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(In thousands of Men)
Private S. Y. Naval S. Y. Private S» Y„ Naval S. Y.
Pacific Pacific N. Atlantic N. Atlantic
14.5 17.4 48.0 28.9
20.7 19.3 52.6 25.5
20.7 21.5 84.4 27.8
22.5 21.7 46.2 28.5
25.2 20.6 45.8 27.6
20o3 19.1 43.8 24.4









^Bureau of Labor Statistics November 1971,
Table III lists the 1969 Total Shipbuilding and Repair
Labor Force of six major shipbuilding nations:
TABLE III.-*
1969 Total Shipbuilding and Repair Employment*
(In thousands of Men ) .
Shipbuilding Repair
Country Naval1 Merchant Naval Merchant Total
Sweden 2 22 1 7 32
France 31 20 9 10 70
West Germany 13 47 6 15 81
Japan 3 121 5 18 147
United Kingdom 17 63 35 50 165
United States 86 29 88 31 234
TOTAL 152 302 144 131 729
^Includes Naval Shipyards




From a comparison of Tables I and III it can be
seen that the total private shipyard employment of the
United States and Japan was approximately equal in 1969.
With the United States ' shipbuilders building primarily
customized Naval and merchant ships that make up seventy-
five percent of its total production, and Japan building
ships of standard design that more readily adapt to automated
procedures, a realistic comparison, between the two countries
in anything other than the number of employees , is meaning-
less and has not been attempted. However, the cost of this
labor becomes quite meaningful when the number of employees
is combined with the wage rate data in Figure ko
COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN SHIPBUILDING WAGES*
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The average hourly wage rate in the United States in
1970 was $3o75 as compared with $1.25 for Japan. Although
the wage rate has been increasing in the United States at a
(18)
rate of about four percent to about 20% in Japan, the
current differences are still substantialo
When this wage rate ratio of 3 to 1 ($3.75 to $1.25)
is applied to the $12,000,000 cargo ship costs stated
earlier, it can be seen that this could account for a twenty-
five percent lower production cost. If the cost of material
and externally manufactured items is seventy percent of the
(19)
United States cost, and this is applied to the $12,000,000
cargo ship costs, the Japanese production costs would be
reduced by another 177o, giving a total reduction of forty-
two percent
o
The Maritime Administration has estimated that the
costs of building ships abroad are forty-five to sixty
percent less than the United States costs. This has been
reflected in the construction-differential subsidy rate of
(20)
about fifty percent that has been granted shipbuilders,
r
It follows, therefore, that there must be something other
than labor and material savings that make up this difference
between the forty-two percent and the estimates of the
Maritime Administration.
Before continuing, it should be pointed out that
labor costs per ship are not only a function of the wage
level, but are also a function of the quality and layout
25

of the shipyard equipment and the Labor learning that is
associated with the construction of a single ship as compared
to a series of several ships of the same design.
Since it is difficult to compare productivity of a
foreign shipbuilding nation such as Japan with the United
States and have the results be meaningful, a comparison was
made within the United States to determine if any correlation
could be made between U. S. industries. As a measure of
productivity, the standard used was the value added per man
hour of production worker. The industry chosen was trans-
portation, since shipbuilding broadly fits into this category,
For comparison, aircraft, railroad and street cars, and
trailer coaches were chosen as the ones that most nearly fit
the criteria of shipbuilding; all tend to require the same
type of labor skills, to be assembly line type industries,
and have the ability to customize the product.
The aircraft industry offers the closest to what
would be the optimum method of production for shipbuilding,
building a number of high cost units of a standard design,
except for minor modifications in items such as interior
trim, etc. Table IV displays the results from the Department
of Commerce, Industrial Census of Manufacturing, 1967,
26

by the same four industries used in Table IV.
TABLE V.
New Capital Expenditures'^









1959 33.8 89.7 8.0 9.3
1960 28.9 62.8 3.8 8.5
1961 31.6 71„8 3.7 11.9
1962 23.0 119.7 2.8 10.9
1963 24.5 114.6 9.6 25.2
196i+ 32.8 102 „ 9 9.6 25.2
1965 44.6 140.5 12.6 25.7
1966 52.8 378.4 9.8 35.1
1967 70.3 408„2 14.6 29<.6
1968-^* 75.9 na na na
1969** 88.2 na na na
From Table V. it can be seen that the shipbuilding
industry has made significant investments within the past
five years which could account for the rise in productivity
o
For comparison, the aircraft industry in 1962 made a large
capital investment, and productivity, from Table IV, increased
markedly the following year when the impact of the new
investment would have been realized; the same thing happened
between 1966 and 1967. It is realized that since these
figures represent new investments and not the net investments
of the industry, definite conclusions cannot be made; but
it is believed that a relationship can be seen. Figure 5
gives a pictorial representation of the shipbuilder's new
capital investments.
1967 Census of Manufacturers, Vol.11, Industrial Sta-
tistics, Part III, p. 37C-8, Jan. 1971, U.S. Department of Commerce.
k-k
1968-69 Data from Statistical Quarterly of Shipbuiler's
Council of America, Third Quarter, 1971.
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NEW CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY




58 i? to el 62 6J oi ty ^6 t-'
CALENCA= YEi»$
tt 69 ,-0 n
Figure 5.
3o Capital Investment in the Shipbuilding Industry
As stated in an earlier section, shipbuilding, by the
very nature of the work involved in the construction of
ships, is highly labor intensive, and the construction of
naval ships because of their co.iiplexity is even more labor
intensive than non-naval ships o The costs associated with
this labor are significant contributors to the high costs of
building ships <> As stated by RADM Nathan Sonenshein, "the
high cost of building ships in the United States stems
(23)primarily from U. So labor cost." This problem is not
unique to the United States as Figure 5 shows; the labor
costs throughout the world are increasing at a rapid rate.
In Japan, for example, the increased labor costs have been
translated directly into shipbuilding costs. In 1966, a
tanker capable of carrying 100,000 tons of crude oil could
28

be built for $65 to $75 a ton; in 1971, the cost was about
$100 a ton. ^ In 1970, in the USSR, a production objective
that had top management attention was to reduce the labor
. . .
(25)
intensity m the shipbuilding industry
=
High costs are not the only problem a labor intensive
industry faces ; there is the requirement for a large work
force, which for shipbuilding requires many highly skilled
craftsmen., Many of these same craftsmen have the skills that
are in demand in other industries. In the United States, one
of the greatest competitors for the work force comes from
the construction industry which historically has paid higher
wages. For example, the average hourly wage of a contract
construction worker in November 1971 was $5.89 while that of
the shipbuilding worker was $4.18. During the average week,
the construction worker worked 38 hours and was paid $223.82;
(26)
the shipbuilding worker worked kO hours and was paid $167.20.
The same is true in Japan where, in spite of efforts
of the Japanese shipbuilding industry to hire more employees
to keep up with the increasing demand for their ships, their
work force has remained relatively constant. The answer to
this problem would seem to be to make shipbuilding less
labor intensive and more capital intensive; thus cutting
the high labor costs associated with shipbuilding and lessening
the requirement for an ever -increasing work force. Capital
will never completely replace the large amounts of labor
that are required to build a ship, but capital can be used
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as a substitute in many operations., This has been done by
many of the foreign and a few of the United States shipyards
,
such as Litton, by converting their operation from a con-
struction to a production type.
In a construction type shipyard, the worker operates
much as a carpenter building a house « He moves about the
ship and the yard making measurements, ordering and gathering
materials, cutting them to fit, and fastening them in place.
Not until the ship's hull is all welded together do pipe
fitters, electricians, and sheet-metal workers take over.
Their work in the completed hull somewhat resembles the
costly process of rewiring an old house, and often no two
ships emerge exactly alike, A production type shipyard
attempts to emulate the automobile assembly line process, in
which all components are precut and prebent. Materials are
brought to the worker automatically and wiring, piping, and
sheet-metal work are installed during a stage in ship's
construction when their sites are most accessible. Most of
the world's production shipyards also have adopted the
technique of building hulls in several sub-assemblies , each
complete with wiring and piping. Huge cranes are used to
fit these sections together for welding into complete ships.
The production of something as large and complex
as a ship by the assembly line process, requires a great deal
of planning and scheduling plus a large investment in materials
and handling equipment. This trend toward a capital intensive
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approach also requires "series" production, ioC., building
a large number of ships of virtually the same design in one
place, a procedure that was used during the World War II
mobilization when the shipbuilding effort was so effective.
This has not been the practic in the United States
until recently. When the Navy had a large number of ships
to buy, it scattered them among several private or naval
shipyards. The picture in the commercial shipbuilding area
has not been much different; orders v/ere small and shipbuilders
tended to custom-build the ships. Contrast this with the
procedure in Japan, for instance, where the shipyard has a
few standard designs and the customer chooses the design
that most nearly fits his needo Because the U. S. shipyards'
orders have tended to be small, and subject to fluctuations,
most have tried to minimize fixed costs by staying labor
intensive and by laying off people when work was cut back.
This can be seen from the dramatic regional employment data
in Table II.
Compared to other industries such as aircraft, the
amount spent on capital investment has been small. For
example, in 1964 all U. S. manufacturing industries spent
$20 on new capital investment for every $100 in wages , the
aircraft industry spent $15 and shipbuilding spent $5 ; in
1967 , the aircraft industry spent $25 and shipbuilding spent
^ (27) (28)$9; m 1969, shipbuilding spent $10, Thus, there is
a trend within the industry to invest in capital intensive
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equipment to make the shipworker more productive and to cut
the overall Labor costs, but compared to most other sectors
of the economy, the increase is slow.
The problem has been well defined by RADM Nathan
Sonenshein in his testimony before the Status of Shipyards
Hearings in 1970 when he stated, "Much of the U, So ship-
building capacity is obsolescent, not only by standards of
production efficiency, but also in terms of age and ability
to handle the large ships of the future. There is a revo-
lution taking place in the size of commercial ships sailing
the oceans, and most U, S. shipyards are not physically
adequate to handle the larger vessels » Because of wage costs,
manning levels, economies of size, and improvements in systems
technology, the trend toward larger, faster ships is expected
(29)
to acceleratCo"
Where does the United States' private sector ship-
building stand in regard to these new ships? How prepared
are the present, private and naval shipyards for the future?
To build commercial ships such as the modern 200,000 ton
dead weight tanker, requires a building position that is
capable of holding the 1000 foot ship; in the United States
there is only one building position available for commercial
(30)
shipbuilding to construct a ship of that size. There are
facilities available capable of handling ships in the 700
foot category in a number of shipyards. A discussion of the
capacity and capabilities of the naval shipyards is given
later in this chapter «, The Honorable Andrew E. Gibson,
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Maritime Administrator, in his concluding remarks to the
Seapower Subcommittee, stated, "It appears that the ship-
building industry has the capability to meet the requirements
of the Navy and merchant ship programs during the next few
years. On the other hand, to meet merchant ship construction
cost goals, I believe that new and more efficient facilities
will be required. I can only conclude that only those
shipyards which do carry out extensive modernization programs
(31)
will be m business several years from now,"
Industry for the most part agrees with the fact that
modernization is required if the United States shipbuilders
are going to be competitive. As Mr. Ellis B. Gardner, Jr.,
President of Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation, has stated,
"If our industry, company by company, would specialize and,
in so doing, each gear itself for the production of
specialized ships, as have the Japanese, and if the wage
differential between ourselves and our counterparts abroad
continues to narrow, then we see no reasons why American
shipbuilding enterprise cannot compete aggresively and
effectively against the Japanese and Europeans within the
coming decade, particularly for the more complex ships for
which we have a better design capability," He qualifies
this further, "The basic volume of ships to be produced
must be designed by the manufacturer who will produce them
in order to achieve the economies of production design
integration and in order to achieve the standardization in
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the manufacturing operation which is so vital to its
(32)
efficient success."
Mr. L. C. Ackerman, President of Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, stated that certain
actions are necessary if the United States is to maintain
a strong shipbuilding capability:
(a) "Congress must provide the long-term committment
to a continuing program of naval and merchant ship new
construction. This committment is absolutely necessary to
justify the expenditure of capital required to modernize
and keep modern our shipyards. Only modern shipyards will
allow American shipbuilders to build modern, competitively
priced ships
»
(b) Individual shipyards must have the incentive to
develop specialized facilities to build long series of
standardized ships." (33)
The Japanese, then, have become the mentor for the
United States shipbuilding industry. It is interesting that
they developed their present shipbuilding system and technology
based on that of the United States that proved so effective
in World War II. They are continuing their progress and
attempting to become less labor intensive because of the
shortages in their labor market . As an example , they have
recently announced in the "Marine Engineering/Log, April
1972", that a shipbuilding company has developed the first
large-size and hihg-precision pattern processing system that
designs the layout of equipment, piping and wiring for
ships, making possible a significant saving of man-hours.
To compare with the United States limited facilities for the
new large ships, over 200,000 dwt and over 1000 feet, a new
3i+

shipyard in Japan has been completed which has a building
dock 2657 feet long and 307 feet wide; all ship construction
work, including the outfitting, will be conducted in the
dock. With this , the shipyard will be able to produce five
(34)
ships of the 250,000 dwt class per year.
The USSR has realized that there are changes
occurring in the world shipbuilding industry and has made
(35)
the following the prime objectives for its industry:
(a) Series production of standard ships
(b) Reduced labor intensity
(c) Design ship for producibility
(d) Standardization of components
(e) Overcome demand for custom ships
(f) Cost-benefit analysis of facility improvements
(g) Total yard integration of mechanization and
automation
The United States shipbuilding industry is well
aware of its problem and has been increasing its capacity.
It is evident that progress must continue if the United
States is to ever become a competitor in worldwide ship-
building in a field, other than the special customized
ships
,
B. PROFIT TRENDS IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Shipbuilders dealing in the market for warships have
undergone a corporate transformation in the last decade « In
the early 1950's, the industry was comprised of a large number
35

of independent firms whose primary business was shipbuilding,
whereas only a few firms exist today. Now, the typical
shipbuilder in the armaments market is a division of a large
conglomerate corpora tiono General Dynamics grew from the
Electric Boat Company, and Bath Industries owes its parentage
to the Bath Iron Works. Litton Industries, Tenneco, Ogden,
and Kaiser Corporation acquired their shipyards at bargain
rates during the 1960's. One result of the "conglomeration"
of the shipbuilding firms is that it is nearly impossible
to uncover statistical profit data on the operations of the
shipbuilders. There is, however, a considerable body of
research on the Defense Industry in its entirety which
displays and analyzes prof itability o This work was done
(36)
under contract by the Logistics Management Institute.
The results it has published to data analyze profits reported
by major defense firms from 1958 to 1966.
In the absence of valid profit data which displayed the
profit experience of the shipbuilders engaged in government
business, it was decided to consider the LMI information
which was based on all major defense contractors. There are
two reasons why this should be done: first, the shipbuilders
were subject to the same profit regulations and policies
as the LMI sample; second, the trends which the LMI data
revealed are significantly similar to those which the ship-




The LMI studies were aimed at determining the profit on
Total Capital Investment (TCI) (which they defined as equity
capital investment plus long-term debt) from the portion
of the total industry which could be allocated to defense
business., This they compared with the profit being
generated on the portion of TCI, which was allocated to
the commercial business of these same defense contractors.
Finally, they compared the data to the profits of a sample
of some two hundred manufacturers of durable goods
,
which
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As the LMI stated m its study:
"Average defense business profit as a percent
of total capital investment trended steadily-
downward during the first seven years of the
study period. It has increased and decreased
by small margins in alternate years since 1964,
remaining slightly above the 1964 level.
The averages of commercial and FTC-SEC profits
on total capital investment were higher than
defense business profits average in 1968, as
was the case for the preceding six years. The
gap widened in 1968."
To insure that the mean did not distort the implications
of the data, the LMI also compared the range of Defense
profit which enclosed 687o of the contractors and again
contrasted the results with the durable goods industryo
(39)
The comparison showed that
:
"High profit defense business has been less
profitable than high profit commercial business.
Low profit defense business was more profitable
than low profit commercial business during the
period 1958 through 1961, but has been less
profitable than low profit commercial business
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For any fixed amount of TCI. selected at random, there is a 68%
probability that ProfitTCI will fail within the indicated range
•'~~'- Represents the boundariesof the OEFEfiSE Profit TCI Range




To insure that the survey technique which it employed
did not result in distortion of the sample, LMI also compared
the audited financial statements of the defense sample with
the FTC-SEC data. The results, shown in Figure 7, proved
to be consistent with the conclusions previously reached.
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As was stressed earlier, the profit objectives for
negotiated defense contracts are developed as a percentage
of the anticipated costs » It has been a policy of the Depart-
ment of Defense, since the early McNamara days, to reward
these firms taking higher risks with higher profits, and the
negotiated profits have reflected this standard. It is
important to note that the experiences of the contractors,
in terms of the profits actually achieved in the 1960's, did
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not conform with this goal as the Table below indicates
Profit / Sales





The average profit on sales of these contracts which in-
volved active price competition (which are included in the
FFP and FPI data in the Figure for 1968 was 2.0% and for
1967 was a lowly 0^9%, These values are sharply lower
than the ex-ante fees and profits negotiated.
When Secretary McNamara took charge of the Department of
Defense in the early 1960's, he took two actions simul-
taneously. First, he announced that the profits in the
defense industry were too low, and, second, he proclaimed
the policy of shifting the risk to the contractors.
If the improvement of profit was the policy, why, then,
did the trend turn in a lower direction? There are a number
of possible explanations, but the theory advanced by Scherer
(41)
has the greatest relevance to shipbuilding. He maintained
that because excess capacity was abundant in the defense
industries, the opportunity cost for the (idle) facilities
was probably zero. Therefore, the contractors bid into
contracts with overly optimistic bids and took what meager
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profits were left after the overruns. Thus, the over-
capacity in the market, not the government's profit policy,
established the profit margins and led indirectly into the
overruns. The market forces can establish themselves above
the regulations even in this highly restricted market.
Profit is generally agreed to be a reward for the risks
to which the firm exposes its assets. The higher the risk,
the higher should be the profit demanded, with the arrival
of the concept of large multi-year procurements in ship-
building, comes the promise of very large potential profits,
very intensified competition, and the opportunity for very
large losses if the goals are not met. The policy of larger
but fewer buys greatly increases the risks of participating
in the shipbuilding industry. Whether the increase in
profits will be commensurate with the increased risk remains
to be seen.
C. THE ROLE OF A PROFIT POLICY
The total system cost of a modern weapon system has
undergone such inflationary growth in recent years that
serious questions are being posed as to the ability of any
nation to develop and produce the high-technology weapons
which purportedly are necessary for the national defense.
Warship construction costs have risen to the point where a
single aircraft carrier is priced at more than a billion
dollars; a modern destroyer is estimated at nearly $100
million. A destroyer escort during VJorld War II was built
i+2

for an average cost under four million dollars; a ship
designed to perform the same mission against today's oppo-
sition costs more than ten times that amount. Mr^ David
Packard, in his remarks upon his departure from the office
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, directed the attention
of the nation to this impending cost crisis in defense
systems procurement. Cost overruns and the intensive
criticism that they have received from Capitol Hill, have
heightened the already acute awareness with which military
managers and contracting personnel have regarded the area
of system cos to
Crises engender a state of mental myopia whenever they
occur, in the defense business as elsewhere. If an over-
whelming emphasis is placed upon the reduction of cost, then,
in the inevitable reaction, other factors will receive less
than their proper weight. All too frequently crisis manage-
ment will sacrifice substantial long-term benefits for
relatively minor short-term gains. It is the purpose of
this section to emphasize the role of contractor profit in
the shipbuilding industry and to discuss the relationship
to the prices that the Navy and the nation pays for its
ships both in the short run and over time.
In the negotiations preceding the award of the ship-
builder's contract, the government's negotiator is faced
with the problem of bringing back to his superiors a con-
tract for the vessels under consideration within the constraints
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of the budget he has been granted. If the contractor's
proposal is higher than the budget allows , the negotiation
process from the government's viewpoint has the objective
of whittling whatever excess exists from the contractor's
cost and profit figures while sacrificing as little as
possible in the performance of the product to be delivered.
The contractor's cost figures can be questioned, but there
is a limit beyond which they cannot be reduced without
some parallel reduction in the ship's characteristics.
Profit is not subject to any similar constraint, although
in practice it varies within a very narrow band. The
Armed Services Procurement Regulations provide an abundance
of subjective criteria in the weighted guidelines which the
contracting officer is charged to interpret » If faced with
the choice of the profit target by one half percent or
sacrificing that extra margin of, say, reliability, the
loyalties of the negotiator to his employer would probably
influence his choice. Shipbuilders would, of course, refuse
to accept contracts which promise less than adequate profit
if their facilities could be occupied with more profitable
business, American shipbuilders, however, are only now
emerging from two decades of chronic overcapacity, a legacy
of our World War II mobilization programs. Despite the
exodus of many shipbuilding firms from the industry,*
k
Among the builders of ships listed as active in the U.S.
Navy in Jane's Fighting Ships 1970-71, the following firms have
left the industry: Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Cc, Con-
solidated Steel Corp,, Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp., Gulf
Shipbuilding Corp^, Brown Shipbuilding Co., Cramp Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Co„ , Manitoac Shipbuilding Co., and N„Y. Shipbuilding
Corp. Numerous others have been merged into larger firms.
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demand for their facilities is still running about sixty
percent of capacity.**
The market structure in the American shipbuilding
industry further weakens the bargaining position of the
contractors. Unlike their counterparts in the Aerospace
industries, shipbuilders have had little commercial business
in ship construction in the past two decades. As shown in
Table VI, Navy new construction contracts have comprised
approximately 757o of all ship construction in the 1960's.
Military work tends to be a much higher share of the business
of those yards which have retained the capability of warship
construction. Faced with a monopsonistic market structure,
the shipbuilder has the choice of (1) accepting substandard
profit rates (as long as they cover his variable costs)
against the hope of long-term improvement in the market, or,
(2) abandoning the market. Paradoxically, the firm that has
built more Navy ships than any other, the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, has adopted a policy of not seeking any more
Navy work so as to concentrate or more profitable privately
(42)
financed contracts.
** In testimony before the Seapower Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on 29 June 1970, Edwin Hood,
President of the Shipbuilder's Council of America, testified:
"We estimate that present facilities are employing a
work force in the range of 55/50 percent of optimum
numbers and the facilities are being utilized at approxi-




VALUE OF WORK DONE BY PRIVATE FIRMS
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW
SELF-PROPELLED SHIPS
(in millions of dollars)
Military Non-Military Military
Calendar Year Total Ships Ships as % of Total
1963 $ 925 $ 682 $ 243
1964 1019 739 280
1965 1018 741 277





Source: Census of Manufacturers, 1967
Table 6A,1, p. 37C-21
Contractor profit is one of the factors that comprise
total system acquisition cost. A simply extension of this
logic would lead one to the conclusion that merely by
reducing profit it is possible to lower the system's price.
However, as the cost-incentive contracting experience has
shown, it is also possible to use profit augmentation to
(43)
reduce the overall cost. The concept is simple; incen-
tives are structured into a contract for increased profits
for cost reductions effected by the contractor, so that the
government receives a system at the lowest price while
paying the builder a substantially higher profit. This
incentive works on the premise that the contractor is
attempting to maximize his profits from a given contract;
that is, he is maximizing short term profits o More subtle
but more germane to this discussion is the effect which
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government profit policy has on the long range objectives
of shipbuilding firms.
The long range decisions of the firm, those regarding
its level of investment in capital equipment, its plans for
expansion or contraction, and its strategy with regard to
the markets in which it expects to compete are determined by
the firm's expectation of future profits » It is against
these expectations that it is possible to apply a second
level of incentivation which Scherer refers to as "competi-
tive incentives c" These forces are commercial stimuli which
exploit the "desire of firms to survive, to grow and perhaps
to maximize long run profits,"" In this arena, the firm
tries to assure, as a minimum, return on its investment
sufficient to cover its risk-free cost of capital.
Additionally, the rational investor looks for some
compensatory remuneration for the risks to which he is
exposing his capital. If denied a reasonable assurance that
the discounted future cash flows expected from a project
at least equal the outlays required, the shipbuilder will
forego the project. If, for example, the project in question
was the purchase of some cost-reducing capital equipment,
the implication for the government of the contractor's
decision is that it will have to face the same (high) level
* Scherer 's Discussion of the Operation of Incentives on
the Weapons Systems Contractor in Chapter 1 of his The Weapons
Acquisition Process - Economic Incentives, Harvard, Boston




of costs in future dealings with this contractor.
Only the assurance of a stream of payments will draw
investment capital into the shipbuilding industry; only new
investment capital can replace the aged and inefficient
capital stock that characterizes much of the industry
«
Mr. L. Co Ackerman, President, Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Co., and Vice-President, Tenneco Inc., expressed
very clearly the decision process of most sophisticated
investors
:
"It is absolutely necessary that we clearly
see a reasonable opportunity for a competitive
profit before we make the extremely large
investment required to move shipbuilding from
a labor intensive to a capital intensive
industry. The fact that this has not existed
for the past 25 years is chiefly responsible
for shipbuilding remaining so labor intensiveo..
If there is not reasonable assurance of an
adequate market, large investments in equip-
ment are foolish. "^^^''
The extremely low probability of long range profit which
most investors assigned to the shipbuilding industry largely
precluded the introduction of new equity capital throughout
the 1950' So Debt financing for long term investments was
also unavailable owing to low capitalization and the poor
(45)
earnings performance of most of the yards » Where, then,
could the firms obtain the funds required to replace their
inefficient capital stock? The funds generated by operations
barely covered the costs of the typical shipbuilder. Little
depreciation was available from the' aged capital equipment.
Thus, it appeared that the shipbuilding industry was ensnared
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in a vicious circle of cause and effect: Low profits which
result from low demand and unused capacity which, in turn,
resulted from non-competitive prices which was caused by
an inefficient capital stock which cannot be replaced
because of the low profit in the industry.
Only the considerable promise of greatly increased
shipbuilding programs sponsored both by the Navy and by the
Maritime Administration was able to attract the flow of new
investment funds, largely from conglomerates such as Tenneco
and Litton Industries, Although other considerations* may
have affected Tenneco' s decision to purchase it s shipyard,
Mro Ackerman leaves no doubt as to the basis of further
investment decisions:
"where the projected improvements require the
investment of capital, the projects are ranked
in order of anticipated return on investment
and the more attractive from this ^standpoint
are given first consideration." ^^"^-^
Within the conglomerates, the shipyard must compete with
their sister divisions for investment dollars. Even the
depreciation which the shipyard generates may be reinvested
in office machinery or in luxury motels if, in the marginal
benefit measured by the discounted flow of funds , the
shipyard fails to come out on top.
* It is difficult to assess the relative importance which
the conglom.erate places upon the tax loss carryforward and
potential write-off from downward adjustment of asset valuations,
which are positive advantages only because of the peculiarities
of our tax laws, in making these acquisition decisions.
^9

In 1963, the Secretary of Defense, after an extensive
review of the profit and investment trends in defense indus-
tries issued the following profit guidance in the ASPR:
"(a) General. It is the policy of the Department of
Defense to utilize profit to stimulate efficient
contract performance. Profit generally is the basic
motive of business enterprise. The Government and
defense contractors should be concerned with
harnessing this motive to work for more effective and
economical contract performance. Negotiation of
very low profits, the use of historical averages,
or the automatic application of a predetermined
percentage to the total estimated cost of a product,
does not provide the motivation to accomplish such
performance. Furthermore, low average profit rates
on defense contracts overall are detrimental to the
public interest. Effective national defense in a
free enterprise economy requires that the best in-
dustrial capabilities be attracted to defense
contracts. These capabilities will be driven away
from the defense market if defense contracts are
characterized by low profit opportunities. Con-
sequently, negotiations aimed merely at reducing
prices by reducing profits, with no realization of
the function of profit cannot be condoned. For
each contract in which profit is negotiated as a
separate element of the contract price, the aim of
negotiation should be to employ the profit motive
so as to impel effective contract performance by
which overall costs are economically controlled.
To this end, the profit objective must be fitted
to the circumstances of the particular procurement,
giving due weight to each of the performance, risk,
and other factors set forth in this 3-808. This
will result in a wider range of profits which, in
many cases, will be significantly higher than
previous norms o"^^'-^
If this country is to maintain a viable shipbuilding
mobilization base within the private sector, it is clear
that the opportunity for a competitive profit must be made
available. If the industry is to receive the investment
capital it requires, the level of profits must be made




in the private sector. The technology is available to
effect great reductions in shipbuilding cost. The demand
for new ships in the next decade is causing some industry
sources to refer to the 1970 's as the "Maritime Decade".
There exists a clear opportunity to rebuild and restructure
the shipbuilding base, and the influx of private capital
from the large conglomerates has enabled some yards to start
extensive modernizations.
There is a general recognition within the Department of
Defense that there is a need to revise the existing profit
policy to encourage the construction of efficient facilities.
At the same time, it is vital to insure that the private
investment in productive facilities, which has been expanding
in recent years, is not over-incentivized so as to lead to
shipbuilding capacity which far exceeds our long term
requirements. Some excess capacity is the price paid for
a mobilization capability, but too great an excess leads
to unattainable breakeven points. An examination of the
incentives provided by the existing profit policy is the
first step in developing a program to strike the delicate
balance between long run equilibrium and another cycle of
boom and bust.
lo Economic Structure of American Market of Warships
There is only one consumer in the market for warships
in the United States, and, of course, industry sources tTiain-
tain that the Navy exercises monopsonistic powers over the
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shipbuilding industry. It is certainly true, that if it
chose to do so, the Navy could exercise strenuous control
over this market in which it supplies between 65 and 75%
of the business. Even these figures understate the control
which the Navy could exercise over such traditional warship
manufacturers as Bath and Electric Boat, where virtually
all the work performed in the last decade has been under
Navy contract. This concentration of consumer strength
is much more pronounced in shipbuilding than in aerospace
where there has been strong civilian demand. The individual
services have also competed for resources in aerospace, as
has NASA and a large number of allied air forces. Despite
its leverage, the Navy is no doubt restrained from exercising
fuller control over the industry by the political onus of
such action, quite possibly, by its genuine desire to see
the industry grow strong and viable. Since the Navy can,
to a large extent, predetermine the ceiling level on profits,
its actions can draw investment to shipbuilding or drive
firms from the industryo (See Chapter III)
The exodus of many of the weaker firms has resulted
in some concentration of economic power in the industry.
However, the high degree of specialization which is required
to produce the different types of modern warships has
resulted in a simultaneous fragmentation of the warship
construction industry into several distinct markets., Con-
sequently, as Table VII illustrates, these markets vary over
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As Table VII indicates, the competitive status of
these industry fragments fall into one of three categories:
Monopoly, oligopoly, and open competitiono Some brief expository
comments on these categories might be helpful:
SLo Monopoly
Aircraft Carriers - This market is nearly a pure
case of bilateral monopoly, with one manufacturer, Tenneco 's
Newport News Facility, and a single buyer, the U» S« Navy.
The only relaxation of the bilateral monopoly model results
from the ease with which Newport News can shift her productive
facilities to other markets (i<,e., merchant shipping,
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frigates, etc.). This painless exit from the market is
constrained to some real but immeasurable degree by the
ex -market pressures which the customer can bring to bear.
Tenneco cannot fail to realize that it occupies a sensitive
position as the sole producer of a vital defense system and
that awareness must certainly limit its options
o
Nuclear Frigates - Newport News also has a
virtual monopoly in the production of Nuclear towered
Frigates. The General Dynamics yard at Quincy, Massachusetts,
built two nuclear powered combatants in the early nineteen
sixties (while that yard was owned by Bethlehem Steel) and it
still claims that construction capability. One other builder,
Litton' s Ingalls Division has the potential capability to
compete for these contracts but it has not yet done so.
b. Oligopoly
Submarines - In the construction of submarines
,
the producer's market approaches the duopoly case. Two firms,
Tenneco and General Dynamics (Electric Boat Division) compete
in this market, but the competition is rarely decided on the
basis of price alone » Often, it appears that contracts are
awarded on the ground of maintenance of competition. One
other firm, Litton's Ingalls Division, has a submarine
construction capability but its business efforts recently
seem directed toward overhaul, repair and conversions of both
submarines and frigates. Ingalls did not receive any portion
of the most recently let submarine construction contract in




Conventional Frigates and Destroyers - There is
an extensive list of competitors for destroyer type ship
contracts although the demand for series construction in
recent contracts has restricted access to these yards which
can make the necessary improvements to accommodate this
approach.
Large Auxiliaries and Amphibious Ships - The
competitive situation for construction of these ships is
virtually identical to that for destroyers. These ships are
the most similar to merchant vessels and consequently require
the least amount of specialized technology. In the event
of a crisis, the number of capable facilities could be
quickly expanded. Entry into this market is relatively easy.
The single point to be emphasized in this discussion
is that the economic structure of the various markets which
comprise the warship building industry vary considerably.
One firm is capable of competing in every market; several
can compete in a few markets ; many can only gain entry into
one or two markets. This variety has great significance if
the government intends to develop a profit scheme that pro-
vides profit according to some set formula « It is an axiom
of economics that competition, in general, can approach
maximum allocation efficiency.
Competition, then, to the extent that it exists in
defense procurement, is considered desirable; however, as
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Peck and Scherer asset, a full market system for weapon
systems is unattainable:
It is not only that a market system does
not now exist in the weapons acquisition
process. We can state the proposition
more stronglyo A market system in its
entirety can never exist for the acqui-
sition of weapons. To economists schooled
in the virtues of the market system as a
solution to the problems of economic
organization, this is a regrettable con-
clusion. C^+^)
The often stated intent of the government regulations
with regard to profit is to approximate the effects of the
competitive market pressure where that pressure does not
naturally exist » This is the object in the regulation of
public utilities and public transportation. It is also the
presumed goal in the regulation of the systems acquisition
process. Unfortunately, the history of such regulation is
marred by distortion which the regulations have themselves
fosteredo
In shipbuilding, where competition exists alongside
monopolies, caution must be employed in the enactment of
regulations to insure that competition is not eroded by
unforseen side effects of the regulations. What occurs in
the market for submarines may have an effect in the market
for destroyers since the factors of production are similar.
Considerable study should be given to the faults which have
emerged in previous profit systems if the errors of history
are not to be repeated.
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IIIo ALTERNATIVE PROFIT POLICY
A. THE CURRENT APPROACH: WEIGHTED GUIDELINES METHOD
1. Application
As an outgrowth of a series of studies conducted by
the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), in the early 1960's,
the Department of Defense instituted a profit policy based
upon the establishment of a series of weighted guidelines.
The philosophy behind this policy is that the target profit
or fee should reflect the amount and type of effort which the
contractor is expending. For example, if the prime contractor
intends to employ a highly talented design team on the contract,
the Weighted Guidelines policy holds that he would be entitled
to a higher profit objective than the contractor who intends
to subcontract all of the work. Previously the profit or fee
objective was not related to the type of work being performed
and it would have been possible for both of the contractors
in this example to request the same percentage of the profit
on costs as their reward.
The Weighted Guideline procedure directed that the
costs in the contract be broken out by category and assigned
a weighting factor which would represent the relative com-
plexity of the task. Table VIII summarizes the various cost







CONTRACTOR'S INPUT TO TOTAL PERF0R]^1ANCE
Weight Ranges
Direct Materials
Purchased Parts ------------- 1 to k
Subcontracted Items ---------- 1 to 5
Other Materials ------------ I to 4
Engineering Labor ------------- 9 to 15
Engineering Overhead -----_---__ 6 to 9
Manufacturing Labor --------___- 5 to 9
Manufacturing Overhead -------___ 4 to 7
General and Administrative Expenses - - - - 6 to 8
There is a clear emphasis in the Weighted Guidelines
upon the employment of labor in general, and engineering labor
in particularo The text in ASPR which describes the usage of
the table further explains that the upper range of value
within that category is to be reserved for those projects
needing "notable scientific talent or unusual or scarce
engineering talent."
In a trade-off between tv/o proposals of equal overall
cost, the higher profit figure is assigned to the approach
which utilizes the greater amount of engineering effort. This
places a premium on high-technology proposals. In another
comparison between two projects, one an engineering effort,
and the other a manufacturing effort, the higher profit
figure would be assigned to the former.
In addition to weighting the various cost categories,
the ASPR also provides for subjective criteria which reflect
the contracting officer's assessment of past performance,
requirements for nev7 government facilities, the risk burden
of the contract, etCo, The motive of the Government in






CONTRACTOR'S ASSUMPTION OF CONTRACT
COST RISK ---------..-------- Oto 7%
Type of Contract
Reasonableness of Cost Estimate
Difficulty of Contract Task








Inventive and Developmental Contributions
Labor Surplus Area Participation
SELECTED FACTORS ---- ---------- -2 to +2%
Source of Resources
Government or Contractor Source of
Financial and Material Resources,
Special Achievement
Other
SPECIAL PROFIT CONSIDERATION - See 3-808 „6.
The category for source of resources was included
to compensate for what v/as a recognized weakness in the
Weighted Guidelines when they were initially devised. The
LMI study team had originally believed that a weighting
factor should be assigned to the capital employed on a con-
tract but concluded that the practical difficulties in
allocating a firm's capital assets to a specific contract
outweighed the possible benefits. Consequently, there is
today no explicit recognition of a firm's capital investment
in the Weighted Guidelines Method» The categorj?^, source of
resources, was included to provide an implicit incentive
for capital investment by attaching a profit penalty to
contractor attempts to use government ov/ned facilities and
equipment o As applied by the AS PR, the source of resources
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weighting is only invoked if the contractor is requesting new
government facilities; government property already in the
inventory is not taken into considerationo This category, as
it is employed, is designed to influence the contractor's
capital investment plans o It is questionable what effect, if
any, this element has on the capital/labor trade-off decision
of the shipbuilding contractor. The weight placed upon labor
is not offset by the seldom invoked source of resource
penalty
o
Two points about the Weighted Guidelines bear special
mentiono First, the WGL approach is an ex-ante effort designed
to provide a target profit percentage o The actual profit
which the contractor receives may vary widely from the target
figure depending upon the type of contract awarded and the
contractor's ability to achieve V7hatever incentive provisions
are provided o Secondly, the target profit of fee figure,
which the guidelines generate, is expressed as a dollar
amount but is based upon a percentage of the projected cost.
If two cost proposals are submitted by a single firm employing
the same cost element proportion, then the higher dollar
profit figure will be attached to the higher cost estimate
The basic philosophy is to provide a consistent profit on
sales o In theory, if not always in practice, profit is
positively correlated with cost.
^^ The Effect of Weighted Guidelines on Defense Industries
An examination of the essential characteristics of
hypothetical contracts v;hich would be assigned the extremes
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of allowable profit under the WGL might provide some clues
to the peculiar incentive which they provide. For example:
Hypothetical Profile on a Maximum WGL Profit Work Effort
(a) Involves considerable engineering design talent
of the highest caliber
(b) Is a very high cost effort
(c) May employ little or no company owned capital
resources
(d) If there is any production activity, it involves
handcrafting of the product (very labor intensive)
Hypothetical Profile of a Minimum WGL Profit Work Effort
(a) Involves a highly mechanized, labor-saving
production activity
(b) Involves little, if any, engineering talent
(c) Is a very low cost operation
Several points emerge from an anlysis of this comparison
which warrant further examination <= There is a clear implied
incentive to become involved in an activity which employs
highly trained scientific personnel. Consequently, the
design effort which the profit approach encourages is the
one employing the most advanced technology. It is at least
a possibility that this implied incentive is partially
responsible for the delivery of overly complex specifications
with a reliance upon sophistication when simplicity would
(52)
suffice.. This provision may increase the technological
risk of the system under contract. It may also lead to a
misallocation of an important national resource: the avail-
able pool of engineering talent. If the weight on engineering
61

labor is excessive, then engineering talent could be in-
effectively allocated to defense contractors o Any hoarding
of these technical talents could oppose the overall goals of
the nation
o
In the past, this would not have been a serious
issue in the shipbuilding industry, as opposed to aerospace,
owing to the Navy^s tradition of designing ships "in house"
(ioeo, within the Bureau of Ships ) » Bids were requested to
construct the ships in conformance with the Navy design
specifications. Since 1967, however, the Navy has pursued
the philosophy that contractors can effect savings by
designing the vessels themselves, taking into consideration
the peculiarities of their production facilities » The
Navy has, on several programs, awarded contracts after a
design competition in v/hich the shipbuilderc developed their
own plans to meet the Navy performance standards. In the
initial competition for the DD-963, six shipbuilding firms
engaged in duplicate design efforts which involved literally
hundreds of the nation's top engineers., Hov/ever, only one
firm was awarded the final contract. The demands V7hich this
revised ship design procedure places upon the supply of
engineers is further accentuated by the profit premiums v7hich
the Weighted Guidelines award to contractors employing an
engineering team,
3 o The Effect of the Weighted Guidelines on Profit
In the absence of competition (and implicitly the
absence of Scherer's competitive incentive), the Weighted
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Guidelines and all profit schemes based on costs are vulnerable
to the accusation that they provide a long-range incentive to
increase cos to In the absence of competition, a contractor
will find no reason to lower his cost estimates or to
implement cost reduction programs o As was shown earlier,
there is a very narrow range within which profits have been
negotiated despite variations in cost composition. As a
practical matter then, it probably can be assumed tViat profit
maximization depends largely on maintaining contracts with
the government based on the largest cost base possible,.
Indeed, in the case of shipyards, maintaining a monopoly
position, there is little to motivate them other\^7ise; profit
maximization in an atmosphere of relatively fixed profit/cost
ratios is dependent upon cost maxiraizationo Incentive
contracts
,
vjhich may effectively promote lower costs on a
single contract, are unlikely to motivate the monopolistic
contractor to undertake any investment which will weaken the
negotiation position on future contracts. Each completed
contract builds the data base which will be used for future
negotiations o In the simplest terms this means that if a
contractor builds a submarine on this year's procurement
at a cost of $10 million below the target price, the target
for follow-on procurements could be $10 million lower than
on the initial buyo Other factors, such as inflation, the
learning curve, changed specifications affect the price of
the new system; but the costs and the schedules of previous





Contractors recognize that any investment which
reduces total cost can, over the long run, reduce profit.
Cost incentive contracts can only provide impetus for sub-
stantial investment in cost-reducing capital equipment under
some very special circumstances. The contract must be of
sufficient duration to assure that the contractor will be
able to recover enough profit through the incentive scheme
to offset (1) the initial investment and (2) the discounted
value of future profits foregone by lower cost estimates on
future contracts. Multi-year procurements possibly provide
some motivation to invest through cost incentive contracts
even in the absence of competition.
Where competition is present, it provides the
"competitive incentive" wherein the alternative to invest
may entail losing a vital contracts Price competition
between two contractors can provide a powerful incentive to
invest in cost-reducing equipment, as discussed in the
previous section.
It is unreasonable to expect contractors to reduce
cost if, by so doing, they will reduce their profits « It is
even more absurd to expect that contractors v/ould increase
their investment to effect a cost reduction if the net
result is a lower level of profits Under the Weighted Guide-
line scheme each dollar invested has a negative marginal
revenue product; no rational businessman would increase his
investment under these conditions c Managers ultimately are
held responsible to stockholders principally on the basis of
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rate of return » If a contractor is faced with the conditions
imposed by the Weighted Guidelines, (ioe., fixed profit/cost
ratio), he can improve his rate of return in two ways: (I)
by increasing his costs or (2) by decreasing his investment.
The end object of the investor, to maximize the rate of return
on his invested capital is incompatible with the cost
minimization goal of the government. The Weighted Guidelines
and profit, therefore, provide a powerful but unfortunately
a perverse incentive on system cost.
^» The Effect of the Welpjhted Guidelines on Mobilization
Assuming that the goal of a firm is maximization of
rate of return, it has been demons traed that basing profit on
costs provides the firm with a powerful incentive to dis-
invest. If competitive effects can be ignored, the firm
having the lov/est ratio of capital to costs would have the
highest rate of return <> However, the long range objective
of firms must account for the action of competitors if entry
into the industry is possible. To assure its continued
position in the industry, the firm must insure that it
adjusts its plant size to produce the quantities being
demanded at a competitive price. Failure to do so may mean
that the company loses its market and ceases to exist. For
this reason, strong shipbuilding firm^ reacted to the prospect
of greatly improved demand for shipping in the late 1960 's
by increased investment. This action does not imply that
the optimum allocation of capital and labor results. If the
Weighted Guidelines has any effect at all upon the contractor's
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investment decisions, it must be assumed that profit on cost
biases the contractor allocations in favor of labor. That
is, even though contractors are expanding their plants, they
are doing so despite the WGL incentives to keep the capital
base at nominal level » Since the nation's mobilization
ability is primarily a function of industrial capacity,
lower than optimal level of capital is implicitly the
equivalent of a suboptimal mobilization base. The effects
of the WGL compounds the influence which the low level of
profits discussed in Chapter II o has upon the incentive
to invest and consequently upon mobilization posture,
~* ° The Effect of the Weighted Guidelines on Firms with
Different Capital Turnover
In standard accounting texts the measure most
frequently endorsed as the best single indicator of the
profitability of the firm is in the ratio referred to as
return on investment. There are subsidiary ratios which
are factors of return on investment: Operating profits and
(53)
Investment Turnover* That is:
RETURN ON INVESTMENT = INVESTMENT TURNOVER X OPERATING
PROFIT RATIO
or
= SALES X INCOME
TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTED SALES
As Anthony states in his text:
Many consider this (return on investment) to be
the most useful way of looking at the overall per-
formance of a business. It shows that performance
can be improved either by generating more sales
volume per dollar of capital employed or by increasing
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the profit margin on each dollar of sales generated
»
It shows that a supermarket earning 1 percent on
sales may be doing as good a job for its investors
as a department store earning 10 percent when the
supermarket has an investment turnover of twenty
and the department store a turnover of two.^^^-^
An LMI study of the weighted guidelines makes a similar
(55)
argument : ^ ^
It is universally agreed in financial management
circles that a percentage of profit on sales or
costs is significant only within a group of homo-
geneous operations o There is no necessary con-
sistency beti-7een the rate of profit on costs in
one kind of business or company financial structure
and that in another
»
The incredible fact is that the weighted guidelines and all
other profit systems based solely on costs are implicitly
ignoring the effect of the capital turnover on profitabilitya
B. BRITISH DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
The philosophy of the British Government vis-a-vis
competition in its defense industries differs sharply from
that of the United States Government. The British military
budget is no longer designed to support its once expansive
holding, consequently, fewer firms are required to fulfill
the needs of the British military forces <. New weapons system
developments would have to be fewer and the production
runs shorter. Realizing this, the British Government has
pursued a policy of encouraging mergers and consolidation
in both aerospace and in shipbuilding industries. What has
resulted, in effect, is a series of government-controlled
monopolies which operate under a set of rules which guarantee
them a moderate rate of return « That the arrangement does
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not arouse the passions of opposition which it surely would
prompt in this country is largely a reflection of the
different economic paths which the two countries have followed
in the decades since "World War II; Britain's Labor Government
has nationalized many of the capital industries (coal, steel,
railways )o The familiarity of the British people with these
national monopolies has gradually eroded any psychological
barriers which existed to the idea of a nationalized industry.
The mergers which occurred merely brought the institutional
firm in to concert with the economic facts. Competition has
not played a role in assignment of weapon system contracts for
a decade; contracts have been awarded on a quota basis.
Faced with this economic structure, the British developed
a system which would assure the existence of the fev; remaining
firms in the defense industry by providing what amounts to a
guaranteed rate of profit on capital invested.
Expressed in its simplest terms, the British profit works
as follows. There is an annual calculation of the average
capital employed which includes both the owner's equity and
a computed figure for debt financing employed. This figure
is then used to compute the turnover ratio based on the
previous year's sales volume » The resultant figure is sub-
stituted into a formula virtually identical to the return
on investment formula used in the previous section. For
example, if a firm with Average Capital Employed of $100




Government Profit Standard (GPS) = Profit on Cost X
Turnover rate
where the GPS is 10%
Profit objective = 1.6 = 167o
.10
The Government Profit Standard is calculated periodically
to reflect the average earnings on assets being experienced
in the British industry.
The resultant figures are adjusted for unusual risk or
efficiency o Once computed, the profit objective applies
to all contracts awarded during the next year. The government
selects the profit standard and adjusts it to conform to
industry-wide averages on the basis of periodic reviews.
No consideration is given to the contract costs in setting
profit objectives
o
The British experience with this system has not been an
unmitigated success » The accusation is frequently made that
the system provides no incentive by industry to invest in
capital equipment that would reduce overall capital require-
ments. Profits based entirely on capital encourage in-
efficient use of that capital.
Earning stability is one of the benefits most frequently
cited by advocates of ROI - based profit systems o Yet the
British experience indicates that profits based on return
on investment are not significantly more stable than those




RATE OF RETURN ON NET ASSETS IN U,S. AND
U.K. AEROSPACE FIRMS ^^7)
Year U. S. U. K.
1956 .345 .185
1957 _ _____ _ .313 .157
1958 _-__-____-__-_- .226 .126
1959 ,137 ol06
I960 -_--_--_--_-__- .103 „094
1961 .143 .059
1962 -- ___________ .181 „070
1963 .164 o087
1964 --------------- .182 .063
Average ------- ,199 .105
This instability probably stems from the mechanics of
the British approach rather than from inherent weakness in
the concept of asset-based systems. The British base the
turnover ratio to be applied in next year's computation
on the current year's data. As long as sales are not stable,
the actual turnover ratio will differ from the turnover
ratio being applied. Consequently, in time of rising sales
the profit will be higher; when sales fall from year to year,
profit will follow it down.
The British, in their system, make no attempt to appor-
tion the capital base to individual contracts. The target
profit on contract cost is applied to all contracts without
regard to the proportion of the capital base they employ.
Since the capital intensities of various projects differ, a
firm will make more than the target rate of return (on assets)
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Despite the inaccuracies of the British system, it does
have an appealing simplicity of appLicationo However, the
factor that makes it simple makes it unadaptable to the
American situation. The American public harbors an aversion
to the concept of guaranteed profits for defense contractors,
which is a clear premise of the British profit system^
G. REGULATED INDUSTRIES
In the American Economy, public utility status has been
chiefly imposed on those industries which exhibit decreasing
average cost to scale. The economies of scale make it
possible for a large producer to produce at a lower cost than
his smaller competitor « This often gives the larger producer
the advantage of pricing his product below the costs of his
competition thereby forcing some of the competition out of
the market, A decreasing average cost industry is commonly
(58)
referred to as a natural monopoly. The government,
recognizing the need to exploit the economies of scale,
has licensed certain regulated monopolies to provide our
electric power, telephone, communications, etc. By so doing,
the government has also assumed the role of deciding what
profits the investor in these industries should receive to
compensate him for his opportunity cost of capital while
denying him monopoly profits. The device used to accomplish
this end is the rate charge on the service provided.
Utilities are allowed to charge their customers an amount




rate of return on the capital invested," As portrayed
in Chapter II , a monopoly may occur in the defense ship-
building industry when a particular shipbuilder has no
immediate competitor in a specialized field. Although the
United States Government has long pursued policies designed
to promote vigorous competition among defense contractors
,
such monopolies still prevail in several sectors of the
defense industry. Their existence makes it advisable to
examine the experiences of the public utilities industry
regulation to see what problems and promise it holds,.
The profit scheme used in utility regulation is somewhat
similar to those proposed for certain contract types in the
defense industries. A defense monopoly, in a negotiated
cost -reimbursement contract, is reimbursed all of his cost
and is provided a profit above the cost; a situation not
unlike the public utility contract procedures » The
distinction between the two lies chiefly in the degree of
stability in the demand for their products « Public utilities
can rely on predictable demand for their products, whereas
the government's requirements of the defense contractor have
been known to fluctuate widely., Then, too, the monopoly
position of the utility is usually guaranteed by the regulatory
body. A monopolist in the defense industries must be alert
to the possibility that a competitor might gain entry into
his market. Both of these differences contribute to make
the position of the monopolist in defense industries con-
siderably riskier than public utilities.
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The literature in the economics of utility regulation
since 1962 has centered on a theory advanced by Harvey
(61)
Averch and Leland L. Johnsono Their assertion was that
regulation-based rate of return stimulates excessive use of
capital and leads to unfair competition in related markets
.




Figure 9 denotes the firm's production where capital,
X-, , is plotted on the horizontal axis and labor, X2 , is
plotted on the vertical axis <, The market generates the
isocost curve A and the unregulated firm would move along
the expansion path 1 where market cost is minimized for any
given output o With regulation, however, the cost of capital
to the firm is no longer equal to market cost. For each
additional unit of capital input , the firm is permitted to
earn a profit (equal to the difference between the market
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cost of capital and rate of return allowed by the regulatory
agenc3^) that it otherwise would have to forego. Therefore,
the cost of capital is less than market cost by an amount
equal to this difference. The effect of regulation is
analogous to that of changing the relative prices of capital
x-, and labor X2 « Isocost curve B becomes relevant and the
firm moves along expansion path 2 , a path along which market
cost is not minimized for any given output. Since profit is
paid on the basis of the facilities and equipment (the rate
base) of the producer, expansion path 2 is advantageous to
the firm. The regulations, in effect, make it more profit-
able for the producer to employ capital than labor; the
firm thus becomes more capital intensive.
This substitution of capital for labor, ignores the
true relationship between the marginal productivities of
the two factor inputs. It rewards the producer for employing
additional capital when increased labor would provide the
same output at a lower cost. Averch and Johnson therefore
concluded that the regulation of utilities based on return
on capital results in misallocation of our resources.
A second criticism of the asset-based regulation concerns
the behavior of a monopolist operating under public utility
profit regulation when he enters other markets. Averch and
Johnson theorized that the monopolist would have an incentive
to expand into other regulated markets, even if it operates
at a (long run) loss in these markets. Therefore, it might
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drive out other firms, or discourage their entry into these
other markets , even though the competing firms may be lower
cost producers. Considerable empirical evidence was pre-
sented which supported the conclusion that some public
utilities did compete unfairly in some markets. Since they
were guaranteed a fixed profit on the rate base, any income
on other products (or services) which exceeded their variable
cost would add to their income <> In this way monopolists
were given the ability to undermine the competitive situation
in other markets , This facet of the Averch and Johnson theory
has important implications for shipbuilding. Assuming that
the shipbuilders ' aim is for a profit equal to a fair rate
of return on investment, a profit on capital approach would
provide incentives to pursue discriminatory contract pricing
similar to that employed by public utilities. The danger
also exists tliat the shipbuilders would be exposed to the
pressures discussed above to inflate their rate bases by
inefficiently substituting capital for labor. Given the
differences between the utilities market and the defense
market, it would be unwise to conclude that firms in the
defense market would follow the same pattern as the public
utilities, but an alertness to that possibility would be
prudent o
D. THE lAC SUBCOMMITTEE PROFIT METHOD
1. Introduction
The lAC Subcommittee, meeting in 1970, had the benefit
of several years of study by the Logistics Management Institute,
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the ASPR subcommittee, and various private individuals.
This provided a wealth of analysis on which to base con-
clusions and recommendations. The method of profit com-
putations which the lAC Subcommittee recommended combined
the weighted guidelines system with some of the features of
the asset-based system. The recommendations of the lAC
Subcommittee have already been embodied in two proposed
ASPR revisions, one of which will possibly be enacted in
the summer of 1972. The unique features of the lAC Subcommittee
n (62)proposal are:
(a) Equal consideration of profit on cost and
profit on capital,
(b) Explicit treatment of the capital turnover,
(c) Development of weighting factors for capital
similar to that applied to cost.
The following excerpt from the lAC Subcommittee
report describes the mechanics of the approach.
"Contracting officers would make two computations
to determine the government prenegotiation profit
objective.
1. The Weighted Guidelines profit on cost
computation would be calculated as it
is now calculated, except for the deletion
of one factor, Source of Resources, from
the computation. This was the factor that
was designed to recognize contractor
capital employed and has proved ineffective <,
Other than that, this compuation remains
the same.
2o The contractor capital employed computation
would proceed as follows
:
a„ The total dollars for each of the
four classes of capital -- operating
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capital, land, buildings, and
equipment -- allocated to the
contract would be multiplied by
a weighting factor which expresses
the different risks and preferences
for one class of capital compared








The reasoning behind these weights and their
mathematical derivation are discussed in a later
sectione It is only important at this point to
understand that the weights change the basis for
computation of the profit on capital from essen-
tially raw data to a weighted capital employed.
An example of this computation is as follows
:
Class Input Dollars

















The weighted capital employed
would then be divided into the
estimated contract costs to obtain
capital turnover.
The capital turnover number derived
above is divided into a predetermined
rate of profit on capital, which will
be equal to the most recent four-
year average of the realized return
on capital invested by the FTC-SEC
sample of companies in the durable
goods industry, the most nearly
similar group to defense contractors.
To the profit on capital of this
sample of commercial firms will be
added a 2>% adjustment for unallow-
able costs. The resultant r-tandard
is now 22%. Dividing the profit on
capital by the capital turnover will




3„ The two profit coinputations above are
then averaged, with a .5 weight on cost
and a o5 weight on capital.
The entire equation in the proposal would appear
as follows
:






At least three questions must be posed about the
method presented above:
(a) What preference weights are assigned to the
four classes of capital?
(b) Why was durable goods chosen as a standard
of profit?
(c) How much weight should be placed on the cost
based, calculation and how much on the asset computation?
2 „ Preference Weights on Capital
The weights provided, to the various classes of capital
represent subjective judgments of the relative amounts of
risk in the various asset classes.. These weights also re-
flect the lAC ' s opinion of the relative benefit of the
various asset classes in reducing contract cost. This is
an attempt to reward investment in cost-reducing capital
equipment which tends to be riskier than land or inventory.
3o Selection of the Profit Standard
The choice of the durable goods profit experience
was based upon the realization that the defense industries

must compete with the civilian sector for resources. Unless
the profits in the defense sector are comparable to those
available in the market place, defense will not be able to
draw the necessary means of production away from the
civilian sector » The durable goods industry was chosen
because it is most similar to the type of manufacture which
defense firms undertake » Although the lAC Subcommittee
recognized that this standard was imperfect, it contended
that there v/as no perfect standard available. The Sub-
committee stated the following justification for its choice:
"The rate of profit that DOD should allow in the profit
objective for contractor capital invested in a defense
contract is especially perplexing because there is no
absolute standard which represents an equitalbe return
on capital o It would be circular reasons ing to use
defense contractors* prior profit rates on capital
employed on defense work to establish a competitive
figure o Nor would it seem acceptable to use a single
company's profit rate on commercial work as DOD '
s
profit objective for negotiating with that company.
The Profit on Capital proposal would use as a profit
standard the return on capital earned by a sample of
FTC-SEC Durables from 6 SIC Codes. This standard is
a comparison, or relative standard; and, as such, is
imperfect „ Valid questions can be raise! over the
comparability of this sample of commercial durable
goods firms with Defense contractors o Yet, the authors
of this proposal claim that the use of the sample of
FTC-SEC Durables as a profit standard is rooted firmly
in the argument that defense firms compete for capital
in the free market place; and therefore, if they are
to stay in business, must earn a return which approaches
parity with that earned by the most comparable commercial
firms o Both a public obligation for equal treatment and
practical inducements to invest capital in defense
require this."^"^-^
4 „ Weight on Capital vs Weight on Cost
The recoiTLmendation that the profit objective should
reflect the capital invested (more accurately, the capital
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turnover) and contract costs was based on some sensitivity
tests which the lAG Subconmiittee conducted „ It was found
that using a 22% Standard of Profit, the 50% on Capital/
50% on cost weighting produced overall return on capital
figures which the Subcommittee deemed reasonable <> The
rationale for retaining some weighting on cost was more
precisely definedo It was reasonsed that the straight
return on capital model tends to (1) produce a guaranteed
fixed return on capital, and (2) provides no incentive to
be efficient in the use of capitalo These effects, and
the desire to reflect the magnitude of the undertaking in
the profit awarded led the lAC Subcommittee to its
(66)
recommendations. The proposed ASPR revisions have
adopted the lAC Subcommittee report method with a single
change; the recommendation that the range of profits be
varied to reflect the degree of risk in the contract o The
standard of profit will range from 20% for Cost Reimbursement
to 327o for Fixed Price contracts. This provides the
contractor v/ith an incentive to pursue contracts in which
he assumes a greater risk.
E. POSSIBLE FAILINGS OF THE lAC SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT METHOD
A government profit policy is only effective to the extent
that (1) the profit negotiated matches the actual profit
result and (2) the contractors are stimulated to take
individual actions which are in the best interests of the
government o Department of Defense experience with multiple
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incentives has shown that the complex forces acting upon a
contractor may foster results which are counter to the
Government's objectives » Economic texts abound with warnings
of the potential hazard involved in tampering with market
mechanisms o However, the choice facing the government is
not between the market mechanism and an artificial profit
standard. The government is forced to regulate prices in
many defense markets where competition, the market mechanism,
is regrettably absent o The question then becomes this: what
artificial mechanisms can be introduced to obtain the desired
results with a minimum of disruption to the market place?
There is no universal answer to this question, but an examin-
ation of the failings of systems previously applied might
provide a first step in the development of a workable system.
In the ana].ysis that follows
,
it is not the intention
to equate any American shipbuilding firm with regulated
monopolies o What is intended is an examination of the pro-
blems and the inequities which have occurred in the long
history of regulated profits in public utilities. This could
provide some forewarning of similar difficulties which might
occur in the defense sectoro Although the utilities' history
of problems may not repeat itself in shipbuilding, the possible
implications should not be ignored,
lo The "Fair Rate of Return "
The initial question to be addressed concerns the
validity of establishing a profit standard. The market
8i

forces, in a fully competitive system, will establish the
prices for industrial capacity using the same laws of
supply and demand that set the values for more mundane
commodities . Capacity is the measure of supply in the
manufacturing sectoro Excess capacity means that the
manufacturer has available service which it has not committed
to the market at the prices being offered o If the government,
or any other customer, seeks to obtain use of these resources,
theoretically any price offered which exceeds the contractor's
variable costs would be sufficient. (This ignores the
contractor's perception of future demand which may raise
the opportunity costs.)
The fully competitive model stated above requires
surprisingly little modification to portray the forces at
work in the competitive sector of the shipbuilding economy.
Assume, for the moment, that the government extends a request
for proposals in a competitive situation for which it intends
to pay a return of 22% (on capital). If excess capacity is
prevalent in the market place, the contractors will underbid
the proposal to insure that they receive the worko Even if
the contract is unprofitable on the basis of fully allocated
cost, it will be a desirable contract for the shipbuilder
as long as his variable costs are met. On the other hand,
if the shipbuilding industry is operating at capacity,
then offering a return which reflects the resolution of
market force in another industry is unlikely to be a
82

sufficient incentive to draw the now scarce capacity away
from more profitable shipbuilding contracts. Therefore, it
is likely that attempts to impose a profit standard on a
competitive industry will prove futile.
It has not been the objective of the government to
impose its WGL/ROI scheme on markets where strong competition
prevails o Even the GAO, which has been one of the more
staunch advocates of the asset-based profit system, recognized
that this system was appropriate only for "negotiated
government contracts where effective price competition is
lacking o' However, a close examination of the possible
results of applying a profit standard to the monopolistic
firm reveals several undesirable side effects in this
procedure. If demand for shipbuilding capacity is depressed,
then only those firms with a. market position which excludes
competition will be able to benefit from the government
profit standards That is, under the lAG Subcommittee pro-
posal, firms in a monopolistic position will be offered
a profit level based upon the conditions prevailing in
durable goods which has been consistently prof itable, when
the opportunity cost for the use of his facilities may be
zerol Naturally, the monopolist will accept. Recall from
Table VII that the shipbuilders who are active in the
restricted markets are also active in the competitive markets.
Thus, they alone can benefit from the profit policy when
excess capacity prevails.,

yhen the demand for shipbuilding facilities is high,
the profit available on commercial work will climb. There-
fore, a profit standard based on some other industry which
may not be experiencing a boom (e.g., durable goods) will be
insufficient to draw av/ay resources in the monopolistic
market, as it did in the competitive model o A particularly
forceful example of this effect is provided by the action
of General Electric and "Westinghouse with regard to the
Rickover Navy's nuclear submarine contracts in the 1960's.
Because the Defense Department would not offer these manu-
facturers the equivalent of a 25% return on their investments
annually as was available in the civilian market, both of
these manufacturers refused to bid on the Government request.
Their position as the only contractors capable of answering
this pressing national need was not sufficient to cause them.
to ignore the higher profits available in other industries.
A proposal which allows explicit consideration of the
opportunity cost of capital is advanced later in this thesis.
In summation, the adoption of a profit standard
based on an average external to the market concerned is
likely to alter the normal course of the market mechanism
in only one case; it will aid the monopolistic shipbuilder
in a depressed markets The desirability of this effect is
an open question.
^
• Implication of the Averch-Johns on Effect on
Monopolistic Shipbuilders
There are three issues which Averch and Johnson
pointed out in the regulated industries that have bearing on

the behavior of the monopolistic producer in the shipbuilding
industry
»
The profit scheme in the regulated industries,
which reimburses all allowable costs and pays a "fair rate
of return on capital," permits a producer to be inefficient
in cost and encourages him to be inefficient in capital.
The lAC Subcommittee recommendation takes this undesirable
incentive one step further o If a shipbuilder is secure in
his position as a monopolist (i.e., he has no competitive
pressures), he is provided an implied incentive to be
inefficient in both cost and capitals Take, for instance,
the case of the shipbuilder called Alpha who has no competition
and who is operating under a cost reimbursement type
contract o Alpha can increase his long-run profits in two
ways: (1) by increasing the target cost on which his
future WGL profits are based and (2) by increasing his
asset base on which the ROI profits are based. The reductio
ad absurdum of this lAC incentive scheme is illustrated by
the type of action which maximizes Alpha's profit under
these circumstances; Alpha should acquire very expensive
capital equipment which is very inefficient for this type
of operation involved. This would increase both his costs
and his asset base. Although it is unlikely that the
contractor would elect to make this economically unsound
investment, the LAC Subcommittee's proposal provides implicit
incentive to do sOo
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Averch and Johnson showed that the regulated indus-
tries have a tendency to become overly capital intensive in
reaction to the government profit policy. The utilities
recognized that there was no financial payoff for hiring
labor when capital could do the job and substituted capital
for labor at every opportunity. The proposed ASPR revision
probably circumvents this particular failing by providing
equal weight to capital and to cost. It should be recognized
that even this 50/50 weighting arrangement still provides
a bias in the direction of capital intensity. The cost
factors include depreciation as a part of overhead; the
weighted guidelines thus reflect material charges, overhead
allocation, sub-contract charges and the subjective "below
the line" weightings. All of these combine to dilute the
impact of labor on the profit objective.
The lAG Subcommittee method still implies a substantial
incentive for a capital intensive approach., In the presentation
of its recommended weightings , the LAG Subcommittee did not
reference any studies which had measured the stimulus to
deviate from the optimal allocation of labor and capital
„
In industries which can produce their product most efficiently
with a labor/cost of goods ratio of 707o, the incentive
implied by the TAG method may lead to an inefficient substi-
tution of labor capitals The testimony of RADM Nathan
Sonenshein and several shipbuilders before the Sea Power
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Subcommittee placed heavy emplias is on the inherently labor
intensive nature of warship construction.
It is possible that a flexible weighting system which
provides weights on capital and labor in proportion to some
estimate of their optimum allocation ratios might eliminate
this inefficient substitution. If the weights approximated
this ideal, then the firm would be provided a stimulus to
(70)
grow along the economical expansion path. This is an area
with possibilities for further studies.
The last possible problem surfaced by the Averch and
Johnson article concerns the action of monopoly firms who
also compete in competitive markets. The Newport News yard
of the Tenneco corporation closely approximates this model.
As Table VH shows , Tenneco alone is capable of competing in
every market and is the only producer of aircraft carriers
,
Under the proposed ASPR revision, for example, Newport News
would be paid a profit on aircraft carriers and submarine
contracts based largely upon the pro rata share of its total
capital base^ These ASPR revisions would allow Nev/port News
to select the standard for allocating capital to contracts
(i,e,
,
labor hours, machine hours, etc). Since both submarine
construction and aircraft carrier construction are particularly
labor intensive, Newport News would wisely choose to pro-rate
its capital on the basis of total labor hours* This would
allow this shipbuilder to enter other markets which are
relatively capital intensive (e.g,, simple tenders, dry cargo
ships, naval support ships, and shipping containers) and compete
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with a sizable relative advantage. The Government would be
reimbursing Tenneco for depreciation (again pro-rated on
labor hours) on all the equipment in the yard, including that
used in the other market, and, in addition, be providing a
return on this capital, Newport News could make substantial
profit in this competitive market while selling well below
its fully allocated cost of production. In this way a firm
with a monopoly position in one market is provided the means
of restricting competition in other markets.
The trend toward conglomerate control of shipbuilding
has been pointed out previously. The government should be
aware that even a well-designed , well-intentioned policy
may have the effect of accelerating the concentration of





ASPR describes progress payments as "payments made as
work progresses under a contract, upon the basis of costs
incurred, or percentage of completion accomplished, or of
particular stage of completion." Progress payments are
one of five financing methods offered by the Government,
After private financing, progress payments are the most pre-
ferred of the five methods which were mentioned in Chapter I,
This chapter discusser- current shipbuilding progress
payment procedures and a proposed change in that payment
method. Financing methods other than progress payments will
not be reviewed in this thesis.,
B . BACKGROUND
lo Reasons for Progress Payments
The Department of Defense desires to buy the best
weapon systems possible for the taxpayer's dollar o It
desires that the best qualified contractors be motivated
to bid on Government work. But what contractor can raise
millions of dollars to build a system for which he may not
be paid for two to five years? If a prospective contractor
desires to bid on a contract with good profit potential
but he can not raise the capital necessary or the cost of
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capital is more than the profit obtainable, he will not bid
on the contract. Further, if the fluctuations in the volume
of business make it difficult for a contractor to continually
adjust his capital structure or borrowings to cover peak
financing requirements, he may avoid Government business
o
Finally, the Government is able to borrow money at a lower
cost than private industryo These are four reasons why
the Government provides financing through progress payments.
The following paragraphs develop these reasons in detail
The Industrial Advisory Council Subcommittee (lAC)
reported that "the commercial banking industry can absorb
an additional one to two billion dollars of total new
credit requirements per year for both defense and non-defense




conditions o" As shown below, the Navy alone has increased
its expenditures for new construction hardware by approxi-
mately one billion dollars per year for the last four fiscal years
The applicable appropriations are Procurement of Aircraft




PAMN SCN OPN TOTAL DIFFERENCE
1973 3871 3564 2023 9458 957
1972 3855 3005 1614 8501 1600
1971 3018 2it65 1487- 6901 307
1970 2620 2490 1481 6594 693
1969 Iklb 821 2506 5901 mm
>0

If progress payments were not being paid to contractors for
the pursuance of this Navy work, the contractors would have
to seek credit from financial institutions. There would
not be any new credit left for other Government and
commercial ventures in that case,
Financial decisions determine the contractor's cost
of capital and therefore the required profitability of the
investment as noted in Chapter II o Once this is determined,
he can be expected to ration his capital resources am.ong
the most profitable projects. Only if the Government offers
one of the more profitable projects available to the
contractor, will he bid on it. Recognizing this, the
Government pays progress payments for major contracts in
order to help the contractor's cost of capital for Govern-
ment business approach a par with the cost of capital
for commercial business. He can, therefore, make a decision
to bid on a Government contract because of his technical
competence and will not be adversely biased by the financing
requirements «
Corporations try to schedule their work in a manner
that will optimize the allocation of their financial re-
sources o Thus, a contractor will try to match his
financing available to projected requirements. The volatile
nature of the fluctuations in defense business for any one
contractor makes this difficult o It is costly to continually




Long-terra debt financing is unavailable for ship-
building contracts as discussed in Chapter II. But the
assumption of short-term debt inevitably includes high cost
and the risk of bankruptcy if cash is not available for
the debt payments. It also includes a potential loss in
flexibility because there exists a lesser capacity to
assume additional debts. If the Government does not provide
financing the contractor is forced to raise his capital
resources by issuing stock or assuming more debto The
resultant higher costs and risks are reflected in the price
of the products to the customer, in this case the Government
»
Although the Government does require legislative authority
to increase the debt ceiling, it does not face either
bankruptcy or loss of flexibility in the assumption of more
debt. The Government prefers to finance a contractor
through progress payments because the Government is able to
borrow capital at a lower cost than private industry and
because the cost of the product v/ill be less as it will not
include unnecessary finance and risk charges.
2 • Reasons for a Positive Cash Investment by the Contractor
If the Government carried the progress payment and
other financing methods to extremes, all financing costs
and their attendant risks would be borne by the Government.
It would seem advisable to cause the contractor to assume
some part of the costs and risks to maintain a more "noirmal"
business relationship with the Government. lAC provided





"ao To the extent he invests in the inventory, the
contractor absorbs part of the risk that the work in process
may not be converted into finished goods, sales, and profito
The same logic that keeps prime contractors from granting
progress payments to subcontractors indiscriminately should
support the point tliat government dollars in the form of
progress pajmients are invested at risk.
b. To the extent he is required to invest in his
inventory, the contractor becomes constrained by the forces
of the capital markets, both equity and debt, and thus his
ability to perform the contract depends to a greater extent
on the size and strength of his capital structure
»
Co The fact that the contractor must invest in his
inventory motivates him to optimize that investment, i.e.,,
to evaluate tradeoffs between the economies of larger lot
purchases on the one hand and increased cash resources
which those larger lots require on the other
o
do The options available to the customer in the
event of serious program difficulty are considerably reduced
to the extent the government has assumed the financing
burden of the v7ork in process « In other words, if the pro-
gram experienced a major failure, and the government had
paid no progress paj^ments , then termination for default
could be accomplished with no loss of custom.er investment.
If on the other hand the government finances approximately
757o of the work in process, that option in reality is non-
existent." ^/^^
3 o A Trade-Off : Progress Payment Procedures vs
Contractor Investment
So far this chapter has discussed the reasons for
progress payments in contradistinction to contractor invest-
ment » Though the two need not be mutually exclusive, the
level of contractor investment is a function of the method,
rate, and interval of progress payments as will be discussed
in the next chapter. Unfortunately, there is no absolute
standard for measuring the adequacy of contractor cash
investment in inventory, any more than there are absolute
standards of adequacy for any other financial activity of
a businesso Both the lAC and Navy Task Group analyzed the
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tradeoff s „ Their conclusions are found in ASPR and the
Navy Task Group Report on Shipbuilding Progress Payments, discussed
in later paragraphs
.
Go CURRENT AND PROPOSED METHODS FOR PAYING PROGRESS PAYMENTS
1° Non-Shipbuildinfi' Type Contracts
lAG studied Department of Defense contracts with
Aerospace Industry data. In the area of progress payments
they recommended the following:
"ao The usual progress payment rate for all con-
tractors except small business should be 857oo The rate for
cost reimbursements should be continued at 1007o.
b. Liquidation should be standardized at the
ordinary rate until the government and contractors can
reasonably forecast expected profit. The government may
then elect alternate liquidation.
Co Cost reimbursements and progress payments for
in-house costs should continue to be paid on a cost incurred
basisp Payment for materials
,
purchases , subcontract deliveries,
progress payments to subcontractors, and other direct changes
as listed on the request for progress payments should be
based on cash disbursements.
dp Progress payments should be made no more
frequently than bi-weekly.
eo Unusual Progress Payments should be continued
in order to provide needed flexibility to the contract
financing regulations. Preferably, unusual progress pay-
ments should be unusual in rate only, with no departure
from the standards in the other 3 financing variables. This
will help the government monitor the extent of unusual
progress payments and avoid hidden inequities in practice,
while still permitting more financing to contractors where
necessary and reasonable.
f . DCAS should develop and present a plan to OSD
to reduce the delay from the close of a progress payment
period until preparation of a check. Results from the DCAS
sample indicate that the delay can be reduced to between
11 and 14 days for those contracts which are paid bi-weekly
or less. The DCAS investigation should determine whether





g. Until it can be determined that inequities arising
from payment frequency and payment delay can be overcome,
and to avoid imposition of the additional accounting require-
ments of a cash disbursements policy on small business, the
Subcommittee recommends small businesses continue to receive
all progress payments based on costs incurred.
Further the Subcommittee recommends that section
III of the progress payment form be optional for small
business unless the government contracting officer elects
to make this section mandatory. ^74)
2o Shipbuilding Type Contracts
Under current regulations, progress payments for
shipbuilding, ship conversion, alteration and repair con-
tracts are paid on a percent of completion method. Until •
the performance of the contract is 507o complete, the
Government, upon submission by the contractor of certified
invoices, will pay progress payments at 907o of an amount
determined by applying to the total contract price the per-
centage of physical progress in the contract o The percent
of physical progress must be certified by the contractor and
approved by the cognizant Supervisor of Shipbuilding. No
payment is made in an amount which, when added to the total
of all previous payments, exceeds the cost incurred plus
five percent of such cos to These procedures also pertain
to the second half of the physical progress of the contract,
except that the Government pays 1007o instead of 90% on an
amount determined as above, less five percent of the contract
price as adjusted » The five percent withheld, less certain
reserves, is paid to the contractor upon delivery of the ship.
The reserves are of two types: (1) to cover the correction
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of contractor responsible defects, which is generally in the
range of l7o to Z% of the contract price, and (2) to provide
for final settlement of the contract in the amount of
$100,000.00 or 2% of the contract price, whichever is the
(75)
lesser.
The standard progress payment frequency is bi-
weekly upon submission of certified invoices. It may occur
more frequently if expenditures b^'^ the contract v/arrant and
shall be based upon the total contract price as adjusted by
(76)
authorized changes o Escalation of labor and material
costs is paid quarterly. To the extent that such payments,
when added to other payments , would exceed 100% of the
incurred cost certified by the contractor during the first
507o of performance, or of 1057o during the last 507o of per-
formance, the payment of such excess are deferred
o
3 , Hit^hli^hts of the S tudy on Shipbuildin)::^ Progress
Pa;^'ments
One of the pirimary objectives of the study on Ship-
building Progress Payments was to determine if the present
method of making progress payments , based on a percentage
of physical completion, v/as an accurate measure which could
be efficiently and effectively administered and verified.
The Navy Task Group thought that the present method could
only provide an estimate of the percentage of completion.
In actual practice the Task Group maintained that the
(78 )
criteria used to determine material progress was cost.
The Navy Task Group analyzed fourteen shipbuilding
contracts using FINI40D, They concluded that the present
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percent of completion payment method does not do the
following
:
a. provide an accurate measure which can be
efficiently and effectively administered,
bo require contractors to have a positive invest-
ment in shipbuilding contracts,
c, provide equal treatment with respect to the
manner in which progress is measured,
d, provide comparable treatment for shipbuilding
contracts and other supply type contracts . ^'^^^
The Task Group investigated other methods of paying
for shipbuilding contracts » The strengths and weaknesses
of each was discussed. They agreed with lAG findings and
ASPR policy concerning progress payments at 80% of
disbursements (857o for small business) and a payment interval
of not less than bi-weekly. They concluded that a "payment
system based essentially on a cost-incurred system used by
the Defense Department for supply type contracts, v/ith
certain additions and adaptions for the peculiarities of
the shipbuilding industry, would be feasible,"^"^ '^ Further,
they concluded that "no physical milestones could be
adopted," but that "percentages of completion could serve
as acceptable milestones o" *^^-^ '^ '^^^^ recommended that the
percentage of completion be retained as a bound for interim
payments o This would provide a contractor with an incentive
to bring his physical progress in line with contract cost.
If, for instance, a contractor had incurred 207o of the totel contract
cost but only completed 187© of the physical v>7ork, he would
be motivated to close the gap so as to receive the interim
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payment which is to occur at the 20% (of cost) milestone.
Given the inexactitude of the measurement of physical
progress, the physical progress bound is intended to act
only as a crude constraint to insure that the contractor
makes progress roughly consistent with the payments made by
the Government. The specific wording of the Navy Task Group
proposal for interim payments is as follows:
"When the progress payments paid hereunder are equal
to the percentage of the contract price shov^n in Golumn A,
an interim payment will be madeo Such interim payments
will be an amount equal to the percentage of the contract
price shown in Goluran B^ less the amount of total payments
theretofore made
,
providecFlihat the physical percentage of
completion, as determined by the SUPSHIP , is equal to a
percentage of completion not less than the percentage shown
in Golumn G; however, if the physical completion, as deter-
mined by the SUPSHIP, is less than the percentage in Golumn
G, such interim payments V7ill not be made until physical
completion reaches the percentage shown in Golumn G. The
follCT,-7ing schedule is applicable to contracts vjhich provide








2 20 24.50 22.0
3 30 36o75 34.0
4 40 49.00 46.0
5 50 61o25 58o0
6 60 73.50 70.0
7 70 85.75 82.5
* This percentage represents 987o of the percentage of com-
pletion determined by the dollar progress. On 807o pro-
gress payments based on costs, 12.57o of the contract
would be reached v/hen progress payments are equal to 107o
of the contract price. (12.5% x 80% = 10.0%) CS2)
For small business contractors with progress payments based
on 857o of disbursement, the schedule above is modified
appropriately. In viev7 of the interim pajnnents provided
for in this proposed system, the alternate method of liquida-
tion, discussed in Appendix A , will not be applicable to the
shipbuilding contracts. gg

The timing and number of interim payments reflects
the length of the contract life cycle. "If the period of
time from the signing of the contract to delivery of the
vessel is less than three years, only interim payments
number 2,4, and 6 will be made; if more than three but
less than four years, only 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 will be made;
if more than four years , interim payments 1 through 7 will
(83)
be made."
A performance reserve of up to 1% and a nominal
percent of the contract price for preliminary acceptance of
each vessel will also be paid when each vessel is delivered.
The payment for preliminary acceptance can be as high as
4.5% for delivery of a vesselo Provisions are outlined for
final acceptance of any separately price line item other
than the vesselo For further detailed description of the
Navy Task Group method, the verbatim proposal is provided
in Appendix B
.
The following figures display the difference between
the percent of completion method and the progress payment
method proposed by the Navy Study Groupo The names of the
shipyard and contract numbers are withheld for proprietary
reasons
.
Figure 10 is a multi-ship contract which was over
807o complete and no ships had been accepted when the data
was recordedo Under the percent of completion method, progress
payments on the $164 million fixed price incentive contract
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were paid weekly o There was substantial profit on this
contract, and the contractor had a negative investment in
the contract from early 1970 to the recordation date of the
data. Note that at the end of the recorded life of the
contract the contractor had over six million dollars of
Government money to work with which was over and above
what he had invested in the contract. When the biweekly
807o formula of the Navy Task Group is used, FINMOD shows
that this same contractor would carry a moderately positive
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Figure 11 shows a $108 million dollar multi-ship
contract which was almost 707o complete* No ship had been
accepted when the data was recorded o During the last eight
months, the rate of physical progress had not kept pace V7ith
the costs, and the contract had gone into a loss situationo
At the same time, the Government agreed to change from bi-
weekly to weekly progress payments o Note how, at the conclusion
of the analysis, the contractor had approximately eleven
million dollars invested in the contract, and things vv^ere
getting worse o This is the type of contract that can drive
a contractor tov7ard bankruptcy « Simulating the Navy Task Group
proposal with FINMOD reveals that the oscillations of contractor
investment are damped and the large positive investment near





Comparison of Contractor Financing Methods For





Figure 12 is for one ship priced at less than $25
million o It has been completed and delivered but final
settlement has not been made. Costs began to increase
significantly in late 1968 without a commensurate increase
in physical progress, thus causing a loss situation. Again
the Navy Task Group method damps the oscillations and keeps
the contractor in a slightly positive investment mode
throughout most of the reported contract life^
2.20





Vo CONTRACT DECISION ANALYSIS
A. ACM MODEL METHODOLOGY
Any attempt to develop a scale of comparability between
government defense contracts and similar civilian business
must compensate for two factors, government-owned facilities
and the government method of payment » They greatly affect
contractor investment requirements and, consequently, his
return on investment o Use of an asset -based profit scheme
accounts for the distortion introduced by government-owned
facilities which allow higher profits for contractor-owned
equipmento The need still exists to develop a method
which will permit the government's agents (contracting
officer and project manager) to consider the effect that
various plans have on contractor investment and on his
profits o
Shipbuilding contracts typically extend over several
years with work in process representing millions of dollars.
It is not unusual for the value of the work in process on
a given contract, to exceed the net worth of the corporation;
for example, on one recent contract, the cost of the contract
was more than thirty times the stockholders' equity.
Because shipbuilding is more labor intensive than most
defense business , the cash requirements for wages alone
represent a substantial expenditure. Capitalized expenditures
which would provide opportunity for chattel borrowing are
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relatively few. Private borrowing to finance such immense
projects V70uld be out of the question.
The study of the Navy Task Group revealed that past
variations in the level of contractors' investraent have
ranged from $24 million to a negative $22 million (i.Co,
in effect the governiaent progress payments were $22 million
higher than the contractors net working capital require-
(85)
ments.) The impact of these variations on contractor
profits is potent indeed. It is the purpose of this section
to develop a model v/hich will do the following:
1. make explicit the level of investment in work in
process which will be required of the contractor,
2. reveal the possible payment schedules v^hich
produce this level of investment,
3. measure the impact of the different payment
schedules on contractors' profits.
Both the lAG and Navy Task Group proposals for progress
payment procedures have significant impact on contractor
financing. In subjective terms, it is the basic purpose
of both proposals that the contractor maintain a financial
investment in the work in process which is sufficiently
large to stimulate him toward timely delivery of the end
items, yet not so large as to present impossible financing
problems o Both proposals aim to avoid the financial wind-
fall which has been provided to some contractors through
negative financing (Figure 10) „ The method proposed
can also cause the burden of an excessively large contractor
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investment to be lessened for loss contracts (Figures II
and i2 )
«
One purpose of this chapter is to develop a system which
analyzes the Navy Task Group's px^oposalso Sensitivity
analysis is applied to both payraent rate and payment inter-
val to evaluate v/hat effects these have on average investment
and rate of return on investments The method and results
of analysis may be used by both policy makers considering
the proposed Navy Task Group method and practioners trying
to negotiate fixed price type contracts.
1 o Data Assumptions and Limitations
It has been assumed that the FINl-lOD accurately
simulated the contractor net work-in-process and the sources
of financing for the contracts reviewed „ Since all three
contracts were actually financed by the Government using tlie
percent -of-completion method, it has also been assumed that
the results, if accurate, describe the effect of using the
Navy Task Group's proposed financing methodo
Data for the three programs was collected monthly
instead of daily. This was done for two reasons. First,
the authors were able to decrease the amount of time needed
to build the data deck by a factor of thirty » Second, it
is more likely in a real world situation that a prospective
contractor would provide cash flow information on a monthly
or quarterly basis instead of a daily basis o These assump-
tions result in a limited variance between the FIM^IOD and
ACM-1 output v/hich is discussed in Appendix C ,
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2 o Input to the Model
The Navy Task Group provided its report and the FINMOD
output data for three fixed-price-incentive shipbuilding
contracts o The data simulated the effect of the proposed
Navy Task Group financing method on contracts that had
actually been paid by the perccnt-of -completion financing
method. The authors used the following data from the FINMOD
printouts: creditor/labor financing, bank-float financing,
and contractor net work-in-process » The latter gives the
total amount of all costs to build the ships. This amount
equals the total of all financing which includes progress
and liquidation payments by the Government, float by the
banks, accounts payable by creditors, accrued labor salaries,
and working capital investment by the contractor., Since
contractor net work-in-process actually equals the cost of
the ships, it should be relatively insensitive to the
financing method. The contractor's financing requirements
can be derived by subtracting the amount of external financing
(creditor, labor, bank float, and Government) from the net
work-in-process
.
A financing factor was provided by the Navy Task
Group which took into consideration financing by material
vendors. In the case of 807o progress payments, the rate
was decreased by the financing factor in order to conform
with the provisions of ASPRo This factor is artificially
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introduced due to the difference between the actual paynaent
method used in the ship contract (7o of completion) and the
method proposed o The amount of this factor for contracts
in Figures 10, 11, and 12 is 0,012, 0.045, and 0.008,
res pec tively
•
A lag factor provided by the Navy Task Group accounted
for the time between submission of the contractor's vouchers
to the Government and payment to the contractor by the
Government o The value of this factor for contracts in
Figures 10, 11, and 12 is 2, 6, and 9 days, respectively.
The contract price did not remain constant during
the life of any of the three contracts* To cause the
program to accept this real-world occurrence, the contract
price was changed once each yearo For instance, on the four
year contract in Figure 12 , the prices were as follows
:
$22,280,724; 22,599,712; 23,080,153; and 23,319,271. These
amounts are the actual historical contract prices for
contract 3; the prices include change orders.
3 , Outputs of the Model
The first program, ACM-1, attempts to verify that
the authors * computer program can approximate the output
of the FINMOD, Unless this can be accomplished, sensitivity
analysis done by changing the payment rate and interval
would be suspect. The output of this program is the
contractor financing requirements oh a daily and cumulative
basiso Curves proving that the ACM model closely approximates
the results of FINMOD are found in Appendix: C
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The second program, ACM-2 , determines the average
contractor financing, similar to that done by lAC and the
Navy Task Groupo Both determine the contractor's daily
financing requirement as in AGM-1, and the cumulative
financing burden is averaged over the contract life A
different average financing level is determined for various
combinations of progress paj'ment rate and interval » Tb^
results of ACM-2 are presented in the form of a family of
curves to give the reader a perspective on the effects of
payment rate and interval,, The first family of curves.
Figure 13, holds payment rate constant, varies payment
interval, and determines contractor financing requirements.
The second family of curves, Figure 14, holds payment
interval constant and determines contractor financing
requirements when payment rate is varied o The last family
of curves, Figure 15, determines the set of payment rate
and interval variables which will cause various levels of
contractor financings
The third program, ACM-3 , represents an attempt to
consider the entire investment payoff from the viewpoint of
the contractor o It is based upon the assumption that
contractors are interested in attaining some unspecified
rate of return for the dollars which they invest in a
particular undertaking. This rate of return varies from
contractor to contractor depending upon his cost of capital,
market position, and, most importantly, upon some judgment
as to what return is reasonably available from alternative
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investments (i.e^, the opportunity cost of capitaDo The
model analyzes a discounted cash flow of the investments
and receipts involved in a particular contract, accounting
for the progress payment rate and interval chosen, and
produces the rate of return which is implicit in that con-
tract. As will be shown in this chapter, if the rate of
return reflected by the model is not comparable to that
prevailing in the market, some reexamination of the policy
decision would be necessary. As in ACM--2 , a family of
curves is presented for ACM-3 analysis.
4, Anal^T-sis of the Program Output
a o ACM-2
The first set of curves displays the effect that
change in progress payment rate has on the level of average
contractor work-in-process investment. There is one curve
reflecting each of the following rates: 105%, 957o, 90%,
857o, 807o and 70%) o Ninety-five percent is the maximum rate
which can be paid on the first half of a shipbuilding
contract under existing regulations. After fifty percent
of the ship is completed, the regulation permits raising
the rate to 1057o. Ninety percent is the rate customarily
used in the first half of a shipbuilding contract. ASPR
stipulates that 80% (857o for small businesses) will be
the-rate used for non-shipbuilding type contracts. Seventy
percent is considered the lowest reasonable rate for




ACM-2 curves shown below have been smoothed
for clarity. For the contract three data used to develop
these curves, the 807o progress payment rate curve causes




Contractor's WIP Investment ($ Millions)
vs Payment Interval (Days ) -Contract 3
Figure 13
«
Figure 14 contains curves which measure the
effect of varying progress payment rates vs average
contractor work in process investment for contract three
o
The payment periods chosen were those thought to be most
prevalent in the shipbuilding industry. The three contracts
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analyzed were paid on a weekly or bi-weekly basiso It is
considered unlikely that progress payments would be paid at
greater intervals than once per month on large contracts.
The curves of Figure 14 demonstrate that the level of
contractor work-in-process investment is not particularly
sensitive to changes in the payment interval. At 807o, the
increase of the payment interval from bi-weekly to monthly
increments the contractor's "WIP investment by -2% of contract
cost. In comparison, Figure 13 shows that an increase of the
progress payment rate from 807o to 907o at a constant interval




2 8 Day Interval
Ik Day Interval
7 Day Interval
Contractor's WIP Investment ($ Millions)




Figure 15 plots the combinations of progress
pa^nnent rate and payment interval for various levels of
contractor work in process financing o The contractor
investment is measured as a percent of the total contract
cost. Again, it appears that the level of contract work-
in-process investment is relatively insenoitive to payment
interval when compared to payment rate. It is also noted
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Progress Payment Interval (Days)
I
35
Levels of Contractor WIP Investment
as a % of Contract cost for Contract 3
Figure 15
.
Analysis of the zero, and five, percent invest-
ment curves for contracts two and three reveals that the
levels of investment are approximately the same. Since the
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curves of Figure 16 are almost on top of each other, the
authors concluded from this small sample that the Navy Task
























Progress Payment Interval (Days)
Contract 2 and 3 Comparison of WIP Investment
Figure 16 <,
The usefulness of the curves in Figure 15 is
that the Government can determine, by ex-ante analysis, what
combination of progress payment rate and interval will give
a desired level of investment. For example, if it is
determined that it is in the best interest of the Government
to cause a particular contractor to maintain a 2% level of
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contractor financing, then 807o for seven days or ST/o and
14 dtiys are two of the combinations that will achieve that
objectivco
b. ACM-3
Program ACM-3 is directed toward a different
type of analysis. Whereas ACM-2 measured the contractor's
work-in-process investment as a percent of the contract
cost, ACM-3 focuses on an analysis of the contractor's return
on capital investment,, The program output is the time
adjusted rate of return which considers the contractor's
capital investment through the life of the contract, the
average level of work-in-process investment, and the time
value of the cash flow of disbursements and receipts.
The time adjusted ROI is calculated in the
following manner o The contractor's pa^mients , including the
disbursements and the capital base dedicated to the contract
at its initiation, are compared to contractor receipts.
Receipts include progress payments, interim payments, final
payments, and the recovering of the undepreciated portion
of the capital basco Interim and final payments include
profit o The timing and amount of payments are computed
according to the Navy Task Group procedure » This derived
discount rate is the ROI at which the contractor will be
indifferent to the investment opportunity that the contract
offers o If the contractor can normally expect contracts
that offer a higher profit on his capital investment, then
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he would not normally bid on a contract with this lower ROI.
A reader unfamiliar with discounted cash flow techniques
may refer to Bierman and Schmidts*
Empirical data was not available on the amount
of capital investment dedicated to any of the three contracts
analyzed in Chapter IV. The authors used the disbursement
schedule of contract three in Chapter IV to build a hypo-
thetical contract opportunity for a prospective contractor.
Of the three sets of contract data avilable, this contract,
though unprofitable, was chosen because the ship had been
delivered, and the contract was nearing completion. For
purposes of analysis, the contract price was increased to $26
million, giving a prospective contractor a profit opportunity
of about nine and one -half percent on cos to
The ACM-3 program is capable of producing precise
results, but it is anticipated that, in actual practice, the
input data will be a series of approximations. The results
produced are to be considered only a rough estimate of the
time-adjusted rate of return which this cash flow produces
„
Fortunately, pinpoint accuracy is not required to make this
rate of return a valuable measure of the "true" profitability
of the contract. Even the rough estimate which these
projections provide places the financial analysis of the
contract terms in the same frame of reference that the
* Harold Bierman 5, Jro, and Seymour Schmidt, The Capital
Budgeting Discussion
,
The MacMillan Co., New York, 1966, po 106,
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sophisticated contractor employs in his decision process.
It allows the government to see the contract as the
contractor sees ito Naturally, if the rewards promised
by the contract under analysis are not commensurate with
other opportunities available to the contractor, a revision
of the contract terms would be advisable o The employment
of this model in practice is discussed later in this chapter.
The capital base may be the m.ost difficult
parameter to gauge accurately. In effect, the model operates
on the assumption that the contractor essentially devotes a
portion of his physical plant to the accomplisliment of the
contract under consideration. Because the builder has
agreed to allow this equipment to be used on a government
contract, it will not be available for alternative uses.
The profit that these alternative uses v/ould offer the
contractor is the opportunity cost of accepting the government
contract
o
The proposed ASPR revisions which reflect the
inclusions of Profit on Capital contain a worksheet on which
the contractor states the amount of capital that he intends
to allocate to a specific contract., Although the allocation
may be distorted by some companies, it does provide one
measure of investment,, ASPR £-21^4- currently provides the
Government with the authority to request detailed information
as to the contractor's cash flow projections. Since most
large contractors prepare this data for their own analysis,
it is reasonably attainable.
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The time adjusted ROI is, of course, particularly
sensitive to changes in the capital base. For example, if the
capital base on the contract described above, is doubled
from an average capital base of five million dollars to
ten million dollars and the payment rate and interval are
80% and Ik days, the time adjusted rate of return will
decrease from 8o57o to 4o9%o The change in time adjusted
ROI as a function of progress payments rate can be observed
in Figure 17 o The payment interval is held constant at 14
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The curves of this graph relate the contractor's
desire to increase his time adjusted rate of return to the
Government's objective to keep the contractor at a positive
level of investment „ The curve for the Capital Base of $3
million shows that variations in the progress payment rate
chosen cause time adjusted ROT on the contract to range from












Capital Base ^ $3,500,000
Capital Base = $5,000,000
Capital Base = $10,000,000
7 14 21 28 35
Progress Payment Interval (Days)
Effect of Capital Base and Payment Interval
on Time -Ad jus ted ROI (%)
(Payment Rate Constant at 807o)
Figure 18.
Increasing the profit allowed, or decreasing the
capital or work-in-process investment would raise the time
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adjusted ROI for the contractor. As shown in Figure 18,
the time adjusted ROI is not very sensitive to changes in
the payment interval within reasonable bounds (ioe. , seven
to twenty-eight days). If the Government is to cause the
contractor's work-in-process investment to be positive, there
are specific limits within which the process payment rate
may be negotiated. Output from the ACM-2 programs shows
that the contractor's work-in-process investment becomes
negative at a rate of 877o and an interval of 14 days. For
the $26 million dollar contract analyzed the 807o rate, 14-
day interval generally meets the government goal of a small
but positive contractor investment in work-in-process. How-
ever, consider a contract of three billion dollars magnitude
and contract life of up to eight years. Is it reasonable
to cause a contractor to finance an average two percent,
$60 million, from the banking industry? If the reader judges
that the cost of such financing to be contrary to the best
interests of the Government, then a progress payment rate of
807o is too low. It is suggested that permitting the rate
to extend as high as 867o for very large contracts might
avoid this extreme financing burden.
Given that the work-in-process investment must
be kept positive and that the capital base is fixed, the
Government can raise the time adjusted ROI by raising the
dollars of profit.. The value of ACM-3 to the practitioner
is that it provides a vehicle for quick analysis of the effect
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of any change in contract terms on the overall profitability
of the contract o This gives the contract negotiator infor-
mation that heretofore was only available by intuition
reasoning.
In summary, there are bounds to which the pro-
gress payment rate may be set, and a rate of 807o may cause
an unreasonably high work-in-process investmento The time
adjusted rate of return may not be sensitive to payment
interval but does react dramatically to changes in the
capital baseo Lastly, the profit in dollars may be the one
recourse open to enable the government to encourage bidders
in the constrained market place of the shipbuilding industry.
B. PROPOSED DECISION POINT APPROACH TO CONTRACT PROFIT ANALYSIS
The procedure below is a decision process which integrates
the following elements of a government shipbuilding contract:
1. Contract Profit com.puted in accordance with the
proposed ASPR revisions to reflect investment.
2o Progress payments computed in accordance with the
Navy Task Group procedure.
3. The time adjusted rate of return which is implied by
contract terms
»
a. Decision Point One (DPI)
The purpose of the first decision is to compute
the contract profit objective using the proposed ASPR
revisiouo The outputs of this step are, first, dollar amount
of profit, and secondly, the profit/contract cost ratio.
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The required inputs and procedures will be
spelled out when the revised regulations are enacted,
bo Decision Point Two (DP2)
The question to be asked in DP2 is what level of
investment must the contractor maintain in work-in-process
to insure that he remain motivated to meet schedule and
milestone objectives o To answer this question it is important
to consider the following facets of the contract:
(1) What is the projected contract cost?
(2) What level of technological risk is repre-
sented?
(3) What level of financing risk is present?
(4) What is the financial condition of the
contractor?
(5) How well has the contractor met the
objectives of previous contracts?
These factors are weighted to arrive at a level
of investment which is large enough to keep pressure on the
contractor
J yet not so large as to present a difficult
financing burden
o
c. Decision Point Three (DP3)
The purpose of this step is to ascertain which
combinations of progress payment rate and interval will yield
the .level of investment in work-in-process the government
desires the contractor to maintaino' Using a series of algoritlims
based on the Navy Task Group procedures computer program ACM2
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will produce all the combinations which meet this work-in-
process criteriono The inputs to AGM2 are as follows:
(1) Contract Cost
(2) Contract Profit
(3) Contractor schedule of disbursements
(4) Delivery schedule for contracted items
(5) Desired contractor investment in work-in-
process .
If the disbursements are forecasted on monthly
intervals or longer it is recommended that a daily average
be usedo ASPR E-21if provides the authority for requesting
forecasts of this nature from the contractor..
The output of this program, will be essentially
a series of points which represent indifference points with
regard to the resulting average investment » Intervals in
weekly increments are more likely to be convenient payment
periods o The choice between the workable alternatives
could be a negotiation point for the government. The program
will provide all the combinations of progress payment rate
and progress payment interval of interest to the negotiator
to obtain the desired level of contractor investment,
do Decision Point Four (DP^)
The purpose of Decision Point Four is to place
the -contract data into the framework of a discounted cash
flow analysis,
ACM3 , the computer program used at DP^, analyzes .
the amount of profit, and the method of payment which the
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government is proposing. It compares these with the
investment which the contractor is committing and the
disbursements he will have to make. It then computes the
time adjusted rate of return which is implicit in this
transaction. ACM3 requires the same input data as Decision
Point Three above plus the following information:
(1) The progress payment rate and interval
chosen at DP3.
(2) The capital investment scViedule mentioned
in DPI,
Bo Decision Point Five (DPS )
The purpose of Decision Point Five is to compare
the time adjusted rate of return arrived at in DP4 with the
returns available to the contractor from other sources,, If
the rate implied by the governments terms is significantly
lower than the rate available elsewhere the contractor will
be compelled to refuse the contract. If the government rates
are higher than those prevailing from other sources, a reduc-
tion in the amount of profit should be considered.
Inputs are:
(1) The time adjusted rate of return implied
in the contract <>
(2) The rate of return prevailing in the market.
The only output of DPS is a subjective judgment as to
the profit adequacy. If the profit is adequate, the process
is complete o If it is inadequate or excessive the analyst






Tool: Revised Weighted Guidelines with Profit on Capital
Inputs: 1. Contract Cost Data
2o Contract Risk Data
3, Contractor Capital Data
Outputs: 1. Profit/Cost Ratio
2. Contract Profit in Dollars
DP2
DESIRED CONTRACTOR INVESTMENT IN WORK IN PROCESS
Tool: Judgment
Inputs: 1. Contract Cost
2o Contract Technological Risk
3o Contract Financial Risk
ko Contractor Financial Condition
5. Contractor Performance History
Outputs: 1, DesD.red Contractor Investment in VJork in Process
DP3
PROGRESS PAYMENT POSSIBILITIES CURVES
Tool : ACM2
Inputs: lo Contract Cost
2o Contract Profit in Dollars
3o Contractors Schedule of Disbursements
4. Delivery Schedule for Contracted End Items
5, Contract Completion Date
5, Desired Contractor Investment tu Work in Process
Outputs: 1, Possible combinations of progress payments rate
and interval which meet the desired investm.ent





CALCUIATION OF TBIE ADJUSTED RATE OF RETURN IMPLIED BY THE
CONTRACT TERMS
Tool ACM3
Inputs: I. Contract Cost
2o Contract Profit in Dollars
3. Contractors Schedule of Disbursements
4, Delivery Schedule of Contracted End Items
5, Contract Completion Date
6. Progress Payment Rate and Interval Selection
7o Contractor Schedule of Investments
Outputs: lo Time adjusted Rate of Return Implied by the
Contract Terms
2o Schedule of Government Payments
DPS
ADEQUACY OF COMPENSATION (PROFIT)
Tool: Judgment
Inputs: lo Time Adjusted Rate of Return Implied in the
Contract
2o Rate of Return on the Contractor's Alternative
Investment











































The profit on capital approach set forth by the lAC
Subcommittee represents a major improvement in the profit
policy of the Department of Defense and it has great potential
for improving the performance of defense contractors.
Similarly, the recommendations of the Navy Task Group could
largely eliminate the abuses and failings of previous
contractor financing arrangements. It is noted, however,
that in the recommendations , both bodies settled upon fixed
figures and percentages which may unduly restrict the
negotiating range of contracting officers <> It is the con-
clusion of this thesis that the rigidities inherent in
both of these studies may tend to work against the best
interest of the government o Three specific recommendations
of the LAG Subcommittee are possibly self-defeating:
1. The recomraendation of standard profit based on durable
goods - Market conditions prevailing in all sectors of the
defense economy are unlikely to be commensurate with any
single measure from civilian industry. Although it is
clearly necessary for the defense contractor to earn com-
parable profit, only those firms v/hich lack serious competi-
tion will benefit from this policy.. The establishment of
an artificial profit standard which does not account for
opportunity cost of the shipbuilding resources is likely to
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improve the profit record of few shif^builders
.
2o Equal v^7eightings on Cost and Capital - The estab-
lisliment of a standard 50/50 weighting system implied the
existence of an optimum allocation of capital and labor to
government contracts o This system may provide an in-
appropriate incentive to substitute capital for labor.
Ideally the weights should be applied in accordance with
some optimum allocation efficiency for the industry involved,
as there is no evidence to suggest the labor/capital ratio
should be the same for all indus tries o The problem of
determining the "best mix" is not currently resolved (and
is recommended as an area for further study).
3, Establishment of a progress pajnnent policy based
upon 80%, 14 day standard.
The analysis in Chapter Vo has shown that the adherence
to this standard provides an obstacle to what should be the
government's primary concern, that is, insuring that the
contractor has a slight positive investment in the work
in process o A more flexible regulation which allows deviation
from the 807o rate necessary to meet the investment objectives
is recommended
o
The use of the decision point process outlined in Chapter
Vo provides a means of coordinating the profit policy with
the progress payment policy „ Furthermore, it allov7s the
contracting officer to compare the profitability of the
government position with the returns available in the commercial
market place. It provides simultaneous consideration of the




Liquidation , Progress payments viewed as a loan must be
repaid, ioe., liquidated. Liquidation of progress payments
outstanding is accomplished bj^ deducting a portion of the billing
price due the contractor when he delivers an end item. When
this occurs, the amount deducted is credited to the contractor's
outstanding progress paym.ents account.
Ordinary Liquidation - One method of liquidation is to
recover an amount from each delivery billing equal to the
percentage of progress payment. For example, a rate of 80%
progress payments requires 80% deduction from each delivery
billing o This method of liquidation is called ordinary
liquidation
,
and it pays a contractor only a nominal portion
of estimated profit in each delivery payment.
Alternate Liquidation - A second method for liquidation
of progress payments, called alternate liquidation
,
is very
often used for contracts with negotiated profit rates. Under
this method, the minimum liquidation would be computed by
multiplying total cost by the percentage of progress payment
and dividing the product by the contract price. For example
y
if price is $110 and costs are $100 the minimum liquidation
percentage under an 807o progress payment would be:
lOO-JL^ = 72.72%
110
Thus 72o727o of each delivery billing would be used to liquidate
the progress payments o Unlike the first method, billing price
in this case includes a portion of the contractor's estimated
profit at completion of the contract.
* Department of Defense, Report of the Industry Advisory
Council Subcommittee to Consider Defense Industry Contract
Financing





Navy Task Group Recommended Alternate. Method, for Shipbuilding
Progress Payments "
However, the Task Group believes that a payment system
based essentially on a cost-incurred system used by the
Defense Department for supply type contracts, with certain
additions and adaptations for the peculiarities of the ship-
building industry would be feasible* Because shipbuilding
contracts extend over a rather protracted period of time
before any deliveries are made, in contrast to the normal
supply type contract, the Task. Group inquired as to whether
some milestones could be established for interim payments
«
It was generally concluded that there are no universal mile-
stones which can be readily adopted. Accordingly, it vzas
concluded that percentages of completion might well serve as
such milestones. The Task Group has attempted to adapt the
standard defense contract progress payments clause as pre-
scribed in Appendix E, Part 5, of ASPR , to shipbuilding pro-
gress payments with some variations to accommodate the differences
between shipbuilders and other suppliers and proposes the
following payment provisions for shipbuilding, and ship
cons.truction and repair contracts.
-^ Department of the Navy , Report of the Ta s k Group to





Progress payments under the proposal will be made in
accordance with the progress payment provisions for supply
type contracts as set forth in Part 5 of Appendix E to ASPR,
An additional clause would be included in contracts for sliip
construction, conversion, alteration or repair to read sub-
stantially, as follows: Additional "interim" payments will be
made as provided hereinafter » When the progress payments
paid hereunder are equal to the percentage of the contract
price shown in Column A, an interim payment will be made»
Such interim payments will be an amount equal to the
percentage of the contract price shown in Column B
,
less
the amount of total payments theretofore made, provided
that the physical percentage of completion, as determined
by the SUPSHIP , is equal to a percentage of completion not
less than the percentage shown in Column C; however, if the
physical completion, as determined by the SUPSHIP, is less
than the percentage in Column C, such interim payments will
not be made until physical completion reaches the percentage
shown in Column C. The following schedule is applicable to
contracts which provide for 807o progress payments:
This percentage represents 987o of the percentage of
completion determined by the dollar progress <> On 807o progress
payments based on costs, 12.57o of the contract would be
reached when progress payments are equal to 107o of the con-










2 20 24c50 22.0
3 30 36.75 34.0
4 40 49.00 46.0
5 50 6Io25 58.0
6 60 73.50 70„0
7 70 85o75 82,5
For small business contractors where progress payments are
based on 857o the following schedule is applicable:
Interim Payment
Number Column A Column B Column C
1 10.625% 12.25% 10.0%
2 21.250 24.50 22.0
3 31.875 36o75 34.0
4 42o500 49.00 46„0
5 53.125 61.25 58.0
6 63.750 73.50 70.0
7 74.375 85.75 82.5
If the period of time from the signing of the contract to
delivery of the first vessel is less than three years, only
the interim payments Nos. 2, 4, and 6 v^ill be made; if more
than three but less than four years, only 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7
will be made; if more than four years, interim payments 1
through 7 will be made.
The difference between the indicated percentage of completion
and the amounts paid, including the interim payments, as
indicated below, shall be held as a performance reserve for
the purpose of meeting the cost of finishing unfinished work












When Progress of Completion of Paym.ents to
Payments Reach C ontract Is Be Made Are Reserve Is









All contracts will be required to specify a contract price for
each vessel. If the contract requires the contractor to provide
or furnish material, drawings, designs, specifications, computer
software or other items, such items may be set forth as a
separately priced line item in the contract or these items
may be included as a part of the price of the vessels o Progress
payments will be liquidated upon delivery of each vessel or
delivery of any separately priced line item^ However, in view
of the "interim" payments provided for by the recommended
system, the alternate method of liquidation provided for by
paragraph E-512,2 will not be applicable to shipbuilding contracts
Upon preliminary acceptance of each vessel the Government will
pay the following percentages of the contract price of the vessel:
If interim payments are
.
made for following number
- of payments
^_ If progress payment rate is
mfo 85^
1 thru 7 • 2.25% 1.625%
2, 4, 6 4.50% 3.25 %
1, 2, 4, 5, 7 2.25% 1.625%
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Upon expiration of the guaranty period, the Government will
pay the contractor an amount equal to 2% of the contract price,
less whatever amount the Contracting Officer determines is an
amount sufficient to cover any defects or deficiencies which
have not yet been corrected by the contractor. Upon preliminary
acceptance of the vessel the Government will liquidate progress
payments equal to 80% or 857o of the contract price, whichever
percentage is used for making progress payments of the contract
price of each vessels
Upon final acceptance of any separately-priced line item other
than a vessel, the Government will pay the contractor the
percentage shov/n in TABLE A belov/ of the contract value of the
line item and will liquidate progress payments of 80% or 85%
of the contract price of the line itme, whichever percentage
is used for making progress payments
»
TABLE A
If interiia payments are
made for the following
number of payments If progress pa^nnent rate is
80% 85%
1 thru 7 i+.25% 3.625
2, 4, 6 6.50 5.25
1, 2, 4, 5, 7 4,25 3.625
The. Government shall, at the time of final settlement in
accordance with the provisions of the clause entitled "Final
Settlement", pay the Contractor the balance owing to it under




Sub-contractor progress payments will be made in accordance
with Appendix E to ASPR, except that they will provide for
the same variations set forth above.
Percentage of Completion under Alternate Method
The Task Group recognizes that even though it has criticized
the accuracy of the system of progress payments based on a
percentage of completion, the payment provisions recommended
require that a determination shall be made of physical progress
and if the indicated lag exists between dollar progress and
physical progress, the interim payments shall be delayed. An
examination of the provision will readily reveal that the Task
Group has allovjcd for a percentage of lag -- a variation in
judgment factor, so to speak, -- betv/een the indicated physical
percentage of completion and the dollar progress.
Relative to this requirement for determination of physical
progress, the Task Group would like to point out that represen-
tatives of the Ship Systems Command and representatives of
certain shipbuilding contractors have indicated that even though
a method of making progress payments were to be adopted other
than the percentage of completion method, it would be necessary
to continue to have a measure of percentage of completion. The
Ship Systems Command would need this information in order to be
kept, advised as to when vessels could be expected to be ready
to be added to the fleet and for other planning purposes.
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The provisions as prescribed in Appendix E to ASPR for
progress payments based on incurred or paid costs contain
restrictions which provide that the Contracting Officer will
suspend or reduce progress payments whenever the Contracting
Officer determines based upon "substantial evi.dence" that the
contractor "has so failed to make progress that the unliquidated
progress payments exceed the fair value of the work accomplished




DISCUSSION OF AChi~l OUTPUTS
The only purpose of the ACM programs and model is to
provide a convenient tool for analysis of contract terms
before the contract is awarded » They are not intended to
analyze ongoing or completed contracts o However, to insure-
that the ACM model provided accurate portrayal of the payment
method proposed in the report of the Navy Task Group, a
comparison was conducted with the results produced by the
Air Force Contract Financing Model for three ongoing con-
tracts. Since the data used in the FINMOD intends to analyze
the effect of lags, the inputs to the ACM model were not
identical and consequently the occurrence of payments was
expected to vary from the FII'^^IOD. The results displayed below
show that the models produce results which, considering the
different input data and detail of analysis, are basically
similar o The comparison is made for a progress payment rate




Average V;*!? contractor invest.
Highest WIP contractor invest.
Lowest WIP contractor invest.
Interim Payment amount #1
" " " #2
" " " #3
Final Payment




651 1197 653 842
861 856 849 1213
1057 1098 1045 728












2 Year 3 Year




Comparative results for the second contract with a progress
payment rate of 807o and interval of 14 days is as follows
:
CONTRACT 2
Average WIP Contractor Investment
Highest yiP Contractor Investment
Lowest "WIP Contractor Investment
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